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INTRODUCTION

"[A]s a general rule," writes Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist
Edward Humes, "courts don't do science very well."' Susan Haack, a
professor of law and philosophy, elaborates on why this may be true,
offering several reasons for "deep tensions" between science and law. 2
As explained below, the reasons offered by Haack may be less of a
concern where the dispute involves litigation against the government on
significant questions of public policy. 3 Recent decisions assessing the
constitutionality of laws restricting minors' access to violent video
* Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use,
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this copyright
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. Thanks to Bill Carroll, Shannon
Ford, Stuart Ford, Raizel Liebler, Beth Mertz, Mary Nagel, Kimberly Regan, Dan Roddick, and
Andrew Wrona for reading drafts and offering suggestions on this Article. Some of the discussion
in this Article appeared in earlier forms in blog posts on the Empirical Legal Studies Blog, at
www.elsblog.org. O 2013 William K. Ford.
I EDWARD HUMES, MONKEY GIRL: EVOLUTION, EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND THE BATTLE FOR
AMERICA'S SOUL 257 (2007).
2 Susan Haack, IrreconcilableDifferences? The TroubledMarriageof Science andLaw, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Haack (2009)].
3 Humes thinks the judge in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D.

Pa. 2005), "succeed[ed] brilliantly in the arenas of science and law." HUMES, supra note 1, at
340.
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games therefore offer an opportunity to examine how well the courts
handled scientific evidence in a situation lacking some of the usual
tensions between science and law. According to some of the leading
researchers on media violence, "[T]he scientific debate about whether
exposure to media violence causes increases in aggressive behavior is
over and should have been over 30 years ago." 4 They claim that
hundreds of studies relying on different methodologies and different
samples support this claim.5 In July 2000, the American Academy of
Pediatrics and five other medical groups, including the American
Medical Association, issued a Joint Statement on the Impact of
Entertainment Violence on Children, which said that "well over 1000

studies ... point overwhelmingly to a causal connection between media
violence and aggressive behavior in some children." 6 The debate about
this conclusion, says Professor Craig Anderson, one of the leading
media violence researchers, should have been over by 1975.7 The
American Academy of Pediatrics agrees.8 While there is less research
on video game violence specifically, these organizations and researchers
claim that violent video games pose similar or even worse problems
than other forms of violent media. 9 Yet courts at all levels, including
the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants

Ass'n,10 found the research on video game violence inadequate to justify
laws restricting minors' access to violent video games. Were the courts
not understanding the science? Were they putting too much weight on

4 CRAIG A. ANDERSON, DOUGLAS A. GENTILE & KATHERINE E. BUCKLEY, VIOLENT VIDEO

GAME EFFECTS ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 4 (2007) (citations omitted).
5 See Douglas A. Gentile, Muniba Saleem & Craig A. Anderson, PublicPolicy and the Effects of
Media Violence on Children, 1 SOC. ISSUES & POL'Y REV. 15, 44 (2007). See also W. JAMES
POTTER, ON MEDIA VIOLENCE 42 (1999) [hereinafter POTTER (1999)] ("After more than five

decades of research on the effects of exposure to media violence, we can be certain that there are
both immediate and long-term effects.").
6 Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertainment Violence on Children, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
Am. Med. Ass'n, Am. Acad. of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Am. Psychological Ass'n, Am.
Acad. of Family Physicians & Am. Psychiatric Ass'n (July 26, 2000), http://www.aap.org/
advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm [hereinafter Joint Statement].
7 See Craig A. Anderson, An Update on the Effects of Playing Violent Video Games, 27 J.

ADOLESCENCE 113, 114 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson (2004)] ("Basically, the scientific debate
over whether media violence has an effect is over, and should have been over by 1975.").
8 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement-Media Violence, 124 PEDIATRICS 1495, 1496

(2009) ("The debate should be over.").
9 See id. at 1498 ("Studies of these rapidly growing and ever-more-sophisticated types of media
have indicated that the effects of child-initiated virtual violence may be even more profound than
those of passive media such as television."); Joint Statement, supra note 6 ("Although less
research has been done on the impact of violent interactive entertainment (video games and other
interactive media) on young people, preliminary studies indicate that the negative impact may be
significantly more severe than that wrought by television, movies, or music."); Gentile, Saleem &
Anderson, supra note 5, at 38.
10Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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the views of "a handful of vocal critics" of the science?II
In part, Douglas Gentile, Muniba Saleem, and Craig Anderson
think there was a problem of translation, a problem of communication
(or miscommunication) between media violence researchers and the
courts.12 The goal of translation in this context should be to generate
useful information for the courts, which would mean the information is
understandable, accurate, and as complete as necessary for the courts to
render a sensible decision. This Article is a case study of translation in
the courts, one that seeks to identify ways in which lawyers and
judges-there were no juries in these cases-may have
miscommunicated or misunderstood the science. On the whole, the
courts did a mediocre job of assessing the scientific evidence. An
improved understanding of the science by the judges would not
necessarily have changed the outcomes in these cases, however.
Personally, I agree with the outcomes. The First Amendment's heavy
thumb on the scale led to a consistent and appropriate result: a string of
defeats for the government. But in other cases, similar failures of
translation might lead to the wrong outcome. The video game violence
cases reinforce the conclusion that there are significant challenges to
good judicial decision-making involving scientific evidence, but the
higher quality analysis by the one judge who presided over a trial
suggests that courts may better understand scientific evidence when
they rely less on lawyers to translate it.
I. SCIENCE IN COURT

There are multiple reasons to worry about serious tensions
between science and law. Some of the reasons are obvious. Lawyers
are not concerned with open-minded inquiry or with following the
evidence wherever it may lead. Lawyers are committed to a theory of
the case best suited to achieve a particular outcome.13 By contrast, "the
core business of science is inquiry."' 4 Tendentious arguments
undermine the scientific enterprise, but they are part and parcel of
litigation. A lawyer's goal is to persuade the judge and (occasionally)

I1Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 32.

For criticism of the literature on video game

violence, see, for example, JONATHAN L. FREEDMAN, MEDIA VIOLENCE AND ITS EFFECT ON
AGGRESSION (2002), and JIB FOWLES, THE CASE FOR TELEVISION VIOLENCE (1999).

12See Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 40-43 ("Additional Translation Issues").
13See, e.g., HUMES, supra note 1, at 257.
14Haack (2009), supra note 2, at 12. See also JOSEPH SANDERS, BENEDECTIN ON TRIAL 211

(1998) ("[M]arginal science is not the primary source of jury difficulties with complex scientific
arguments. The heart of that problem lies not in the complexity of science but rather in the
structures and processes of adversarial adjudication that systematically disadvantage the cultural
values of science.").
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the jury,15 not to inaugurate a long-term research agenda of discovery or

puzzle-solving. While I assume some scientists operate with an agenda
in tension with the goals of open-minded inquiry, lawyers are
professionally obliged to have such an agenda.
Another obvious source of tension is that lawyers and judges are
not trained to analyze and evaluate scientific research. 16 The oral
argument before the Seventh Circuit in Annex Books, Inc. v. City of
Indianapolis illustrates the problem.17 This case was not about video
game violence, but the constitutionality of an Indianapolis ordinance
regulating "adult entertainment businesses" for the purpose of reducing
crime and other negative effects supposedly caused by these
businesses.' 8 The ordinance, in part, regulated the hours of adult
businesses, including those selling books, magazines, and films.19 Four
adult businesses challenged the ordinance. 20 As the ordinance regulated
the sale of books and other expressive works, Indianapolis needed
evidence-not just "lawyers' talk"-that these businesses contributed to
crime. 2 1 In response to the city's evidence, the plaintiffs submitted their
own study by Professor Daniel Linz of U.C. Santa Barbara to show that
their businesses did not contribute to crime. During the oral argument,
the following exchange about Professor Linz's "hotspot" analysis
methodology occurred between Judge Frank Easterbrook and the
attorney for the adult businesses:
EASTERBROOK: What do you mean by a "hotspot" analysis?
ATTORNEY: Well, a hotspot analysis, your honor, is looking at
crime within a 200 foot [sic], a 500 foot, and a 1,000 foot EASTERBROOK: No, that tells you how far he's looking, using the
available data.
ATTORNEY: Well, the hotEASTERBROOK: What kind of analysis is it? You know, I looked
for the standard statistical tools, like multivariate regression.
They're not there. In fact, in the study that's in the record, none of
the tools is explained. He announces his conclusion. He doesn't
15 On the occasionality of jury trials, see generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federaland State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL

STUD. 459 (2004).
16See Haack (2009), supra note 2, at 12.
17Oral Argument, Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, No. 05-1926 (7th Cir. Sept. 8,
2005).
18 See Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 461-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
19See id. at 461.
20 See id
21 Id. at 463.
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explain how he reached it. There are a few circles drawn around
bookstores, but circles drawn around bookstores are a considerable
distance short from good statistical analysis.
ATTORNEY: The notion that the adult bookstores are associated
with adverse secondary effects are EASTERBROOK: No, are you gonna answer my question, which is,
what did he do? What statistical tools did he use?
ATTORNEY: Dr. Linz looked at the addresses where the bookstores
were located EASTERBROOK: Yes, but how? Did he use a particular statistical
tool? Did he use a logit analysis? Is this a probit analysis? I can't
for the life of me tell what he did.
ATTORNEY: If it's, if it's not in the report, your honor, then EASTERBROOK: It's not.
ATTORNEY: Okay, well, then I can't tell you precisely what he did.
EASTERBROOK: For all I know, he put on a big turban, and he
went mmmm, mmmm, there it is.

ATTORNEY: No, he didn't your honor, but he looked at the police
data that the city provided over that five year period of time. The
hotspot analysis is also explained in the city's expert's report by
looking at the crime surrounding the-the number of actual crime
events surrounding the particular addresses. 22
This exchange conflated two different analyses conducted by
Professor Linz. Linz conducted what he described, first, as a "hotspot"
analysis and, second, as a "before-after" analysis. 23 Judge Easterbrook
asked about Linz's hotspot analysis, which compared crime rates at
several adult businesses to other businesses in the same area over a fiveyear period. 24 Linz presented his results not with circles, but with five
tables. Each table showed the total number of crimes for the entire time
period associated with the addresses of one or two adult businesses and
the addresses of several nearby businesses. 25 The purpose was to see
22 Oral Argument at 3:42, Annex Books, No. 05-1926.
23 See Separate Appendix for Appellants at 125, 129, Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis,
No. 05-1926 (7th Cir. May 19, 2005).
24Id. at 132-34.
25See id. at 145-47. The report should have been clearer about how many adult businesses were
included in the analysis. Table 1 on page 143 is supposed to list the adult businesses, but the
names are missing. Consulting Google Street View confirmed that the second of the five tables
in the hotspot analysis actually includes two separate adult businesses in the same table. The
other four tables appear to include one adult business each. (All five of these tables are
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whether the adult businesses were a significant source of crime within a
neighborhood as compared to other businesses, that is, whether the adult
businesses were "hotspots" of crime.
Separately, Linz conducted a before-after analysis of crime rates
within 250, 500, and 1000 feet of the locations of two adult businesses
and several control areas during the calendar year before and the
calendar year after the businesses opened (but excluding the year in
between, the actual year the businesses opened). 26 The purpose of this
analysis was to determine whether crime increased after the businesses
opened. 27 While his answer could not settle the matter, Linz argued that
it would still provide evidence for or against the claim that the adult
businesses caused crime. 28 As part of this before-after analysis, Linz
included two figures with circles drawn around various locations to
illustrate the geographic areas of interest, 29 the "circles drawn around
bookstores" referenced by Easterbrook.
Both the attorney and Judge Easterbrook mixed up elements of
these two analyses. The attorney's initial answer to Easterbrook's
question about the hotspot analysis was instead related to the beforeafter analysis, as indicated by his reference to the three different
distances. Like the attorney, Judge Easterbrook also appeared to
confuse the different analyses when he referenced the circles in his
comment on the hotspot analysis. At the end of the excerpt above, the
attorney apparently was describing the hotspot analysis for which Linz
used five years' worth of data, unlike the two years of data he used for
the before-after analysis. 30
This confusion was not due to Linz's study. While Easterbrook
described Linz's methodology as utterly mysterious during the oral
argument, his written opinion for the Seventh Circuit (issued four years
later) was not so critical. He fairly noted some limitations of Linz's
study, but he also said Linz's "data and methods were disclosed" and
that Linz's analysis followed an approach accepted by the Supreme
Court in a previous case.31 At the oral argument, however, the attorney
collectively defined as Table 4 in the report.)
26See id at 134-37. See Annex Books, 581 F.3d at 464-65 ("[T]he City observed that Linz
compared differences between 2001 and 2003, ignoring 2002, which (apparently) was a peak year
for arrests in Annex Books. Yet the City did not apply Linz's methods to the time series 2001,
2002, 2003 to see whether the omission mattered; instead it just asserted that the choice of years
automatically invalidated the study, which is not a sound conclusion.").
27 See Separate Appendix for Appellants at 134, Annex Books, Inc., No. 05-1926.
28 See id. ("If we do not detect an effect in the months following an opening doubt is cast on the
City's theory that adult businesses or the nature of their entertainment is responsible for crime
events in the local vicinity.").
29See id. at 140-42.
30 See id. at 130.

31Annex Books, 581 F.3d at 464-65 (7th Cir. 2009). See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
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for the adult businesses was unable to clear up the confusion and also
unable to address basic methodological questions about the evidence he
offered to the court. Judge Easterbrook eventually cleared up the
confusion on his own, but lawyers cannot count on judges to do this.
Because attorneys and judges often lack the training to deal with
science, Edward Humes suggests they may try to "avoid or deemphasize
science wherever possible." 32 Humes may overstate lawyers' aversion
to science. Many scientific questions and conclusions can be stated in a
manner accessible to laypersons. It is the research methodology used to
answer questions and form conclusions that is more likely to be
complex and inaccessible. For this reason, the preferred approach for
dealing with scientific evidence may be to leave the methodological
issues in a "black box," so to speak. 33 Hence, it is more likely that
attorneys and judges will avoid or deemphasize the methodology of
science rather than science generally. The attorney in Annex Books may
have been unprepared for detailed methodological questions because
such questions were unexpected, but the lack of training also makes
these types of questions difficult for lawyers to address even if they are
expected.
A lack of training can cause problems in another way. Law
professors David Caudill and Lewis LaRue argue that some judges and
attorneys have an idealized view of science and therefore expect too
much from it.34 Two different problems can result. One is that some
judges may view the limitations of scientific research as failings. Good
science might be rejected because it is not perfect science. Some judges
are too critical. The opposite problem, though one also caused by
idealizing science, is that some judges may accept bad science because
they are too trusting of scientific claims. These judges are not critical
enough. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted in

Daubert, calls for judges to play a gatekeeping role to ensure that
scientific evidence is relevant and reliable before it is admitted into
evidence (where reliability is actually tied to scientific validity). 35
Playing this role well in determining what evidence is admissible
requires avoiding both extremes-being neither too critical nor too
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 435-38 (2002) (discussing a study relied upon by the City of Los Angeles "to
demonstrate a link between [certain] adult businesses and harmful secondary effects").
32HUMES, supra note 1, at 257.
33But see Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2005) ("An
expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies nothing of value to the judicial process.")
(quoting Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989)).
34 See generally DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND (2006).

35See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 ("In a case involving scientific
evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity."). See also Susan Haack,
What's Wrong with Litigation-DrivenScience?, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1070-77 (2008)
(discussing the meaning of "reliability" in Daubert).
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trusting. The same is true in contexts where judges must weigh the
evidence. Where judges are responsible for doing so, such as on a
motion for a preliminary injunction or when presiding over a bench
trial, they need to become more critical than when they are deciding
issues of admissibility, but even then, the extremes should be avoided.
In the video game violence cases, the courts tended towards being too
critical.
At least some judges are candid about their lack of training in
dealing with scientific evidence. 36 During the expert testimony of
Professor

Craig

Anderson

in Entertainment Software Ass'n v.

Blagojevich,37 Judge Matthew Kennelly of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois was moved to comment, "I am
going to suggest that at new judge school they put in a statistics
course." 38 Both judges and lawyers generally could benefit from such a
course. Both could benefit from an introductory course on research
methodology too, but we should not expect to turn lawyers into
scientists, social or otherwise. Judges need to be "critical consumers"
of science, not producers of science. 39 Professor Elizabeth Mertz
worries that with the increased interest in empiricism in the legal
academy, law schools may drop standard social science courses into the
curriculum without carefully thinking about how these courses fit with
the goals of legal (as opposed to a social science) training. 40 Providing
a standard statistics course for law students could produce lawyers with
"only partially digested and rudimentary statistical skills," without
much benefit to anyone. 41
Changes in legal training might improve the use of science in the
courts, perhaps by focusing on how to better work with experts (not on
how to replace them); but like the adversarial process itself, some
sources of tension between science and law are beyond the reach of law
36 A survey of 400 state trial court judges found them roughly split on the question of whether
they were adequately prepared to deal with scientific evidence with 52% describing themselves as
prepared and 48% describing themselves as not prepared. See Sophia 1. Gatowski et al., Asking
the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 (2001). Examples of federal judges acknowledging the
limitations of judges in dealing with scientific evidence include Justice Stephen Breyer and Judge
David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Stephen Breyer,
The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24 (1998); David L. Bazelon, Coping
with Technology Through the Legal Process,62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822 (1977).
37 Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff'd 469 F.3d
641 (7th Cir. 2006).
38 Transcript of Proceedings at 347, Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, No. 05-4265 (N.D.
111.Nov. 15, 2005).
39 Gatowski et al., supranote 36, at 455.
40 See Elizabeth Mertz, Social Science andthe IntellectualApprenticeship: Moving the Scholarly
Mission ofLaw Schools Forward,17 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 427 (2011).
41 Id. at 434-35.
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school curriculum committees. As relevant examples, Professor Susan
Haack describes several additional ways in which the goals of scientific
inquiry clash with the legal system. Of importance for the present
discussion is that at least some of them should have been less of a
problem in the video game violence litigation, relative to more typical
cases involving scientific evidence. This suggests that these cases
should have been relatively easier for the courts than more typical cases.
First on her list is that litigation is likely to arise in areas where
commercially interested parties conduct much of the research. 42 For
example, litigation over a drug's side effects will implicate research
sponsored by drug companies. The effects of media violence, by
contrast, are heavily researched by academics. While there are
exceptions, most of the research is not sponsored by media companies.
The primary counter-example is the well-respected National Television
Violence Study. 43 Although it was sponsored by the National Cable
Television Association, this study is routinely cited without suggestions
that the results were biased. 44 As for the effects of video game violence
specifically, the relevant research is mostly, if not exclusively,
conducted by academic researchers independent of the industry.
Second on Haack's list is the legal system's aspiration to resolve
disputes promptly. 45 While the legal system often seems quite slow
(and often is quite slow), it still operates on a schedule of sorts.
"Scientific inquiry," by contrast, "takes the time it takes." 46 Private
parties with a dispute cannot wait decades for scientists to reach a firm
consensus about an answer to a question. Even if someone planning a
lawsuit was content to wait for additional research, the statute of
limitations works against delays. And once litigation begins, courts are
unlikely to require litigants to stay the proceedings for many years or
decades while scientists conduct research on questions related to the
litigation. Plus, the party advantaged by the lack of scientific answers
would usually have an incentive to resist extensive delays designed to
facilitate scientific research. The video game violence litigation was
different. Given the nature of the question involved, courts could
require the government to wait so long as the judges thought the science
was insufficient. The mechanism for doing so was to rule against the
government. As long as the scientific evidence was insufficient to
justify the states' restrictions on the sale of violent video games, the
42See Haack (2009), supra note 2, at 15-16.
43See 1 NATIONAL TELEVISION VIOLENCE STUDY (1997); 2 NATIONAL TELEVISION VIOLENCE
STUDY (1998).
44 See 1 NATIONAL TELEVISION VIOLENCE STUDY, supra note 43, at 7 (explaining the authors'
independence from their sponsors).
45See Haack (2009), supra note 2, at 16.
46 Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
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states lost. When the scientific evidence becomes more compelling, the
government is free to enact a new law and begin the litigation again. 47
In the meantime, the First Amendment resolves doubts in favor of free
expression. The government therefore "bears the risk of uncertainty." 48
Third on Haack's list is that science often cannot answer the
questions courts want to answer. 49 While scientists may conclude that
some substance increases the risk of cancer for people in general or for
people in certain categories, it is often more difficult to say whether a
substance caused a particular person's cancer.50 Multiple causes are
usually at work, and it is quite challenging to parcel out a percentage of
blame to each cause or variable in a specific case, to establish what is
sometimes called "single-event" or "token-level" causation.5 ' Claiming
that the video game Mortal Kombat caused one child to stab another
with a kitchen knife, for example, ignores the multiple causal factors at
work.52 Few people who play the game go on to violently kill other
people. Mortal Kombat alone cannot explain the rare violent act:
"[A]ggression is multicausal, and media violence is only one of many
risk factors." 53 Unlike cases focusing on single events, the cases
dealing with restrictions on minors' access to violent video games were

47 See Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936, 981

n.224 (1987) ("In theory, if a court holds a statute unconstitutional the legislature can simply
reenact it."). The Supreme Court of Ohio might disagree that a statute restricting access to
violent video games could be reenacted after being found unconstitutional:
[N]o member of this court can, consistent with his or her oath of office, find that the
General Assembly has operated within the boundaries of its constitutional authority by
brushing aside a mandate of this court on constitutional issues as if it were of no
consequence. Indeed, the very notion of it threatens the judiciary as an independent
branch of government and tears at the fabric of our Constitution.
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1086-87 (Ohio 1999).
This court's unusual view that a legislature violates separation of powers principles when it
enacts a statute with provisions previously found unconstitutional has been described as
"astonishing." Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of
Precedent,78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1151 (2003). Perhaps the Ohio Supreme Court would
view a situation differently where the legislature did not claim to "respectfully disagree" with the
court-as it did in Sheward-but instead thought new information could, consistent with the
court's prior decisions, justify the reenactment of legislation found unconstitutional under
different circumstances. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1086.
48 Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011).
49 See Haack (2009), supra note 2, at 16.
50 See Douglas L. Weed, Causation: An Epidemiologic Perspective (In Five Parts), 12 J.L. &
POL'Y 43, 44 (2003); Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 337, 381-86 (2d ed.

2000).
51 JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY 309-10 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2009). See also JAMES
WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN 17 (2003) ("Causal claims or explanations of particular
events ... are often called token causal claims or singular causal explanations. .

52See Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
53 Gentile, Saleem, & Anderson, supra note 5, at 32. See also ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY,
supranote 4, at 21.
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not about whether violent video games caused harm to a particular
person, but whether violent video games cause harm to children
generally. Even so, courts probably would have liked clear examples of
violent video games causing particular acts of violence. Writing for the
Seventh Circuit in American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick,

Judge Richard Posner noted that the studies submitted to the court did
not show that violent video games "ever caused anyone to commit a
violent act," though he also said that the studies failed to show these
games "caused the average level of violence to increase anywhere." 54
Scientists are in a better position to make the second showing about the
level of aggression or violence generally, which is what the courts were
primarily concerned about in the video game violence cases.
Fourth, Haack worries that litigation may attract scientists who
claim greater certainty than the science in their field justifies, either
because they are at the margins of their fields or because they are
willing to exaggerate for a price.55 According to Gentile, Saleem, and
Anderson, the entertainment industries generally and the video game
industry in particular hired "experts" (their scare quotes) to refute the
findings of genuine experts who do media violence research. Their
"absolutely necessary" qualifications for genuine expertise, however, go
too far. For example, they argue that a person must be an expert on "all
of the major research designs" used in media violence research, 56 but it
makes little sense to reject an expert who would testify about whatever
research designs are within his or her expertise just because he or she is
not an expert on other research designs. They also rule out as a
legitimate expert anyone who does not do original research on media
violence effects. 57
Professor Howard Nusbaum, a cognitive
psychologist and expert on brain imaging at the University of Chicago,
is a relevant example. Nusbaum testified in the Blagojevich case in
Illinois, and while he may not be one of the "real experts on media
violence," as Gentile, Saleem, and Anderson put it,58 it is difficult to
understand why Nusbaum should not testify on brain imaging research
conducted by media violence researchers, even if he does not do media
violence research himself. There is a danger of defining the relevant
universe of experts so narrowly that the conventional wisdom of a
relatively small community of researchers is immunized from informed,
outside criticism. At the same time, as the science becomes more and
more difficult, there is a legitimate concern that judges will be more
54 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79(7th Cir, 2001).
55 See Haack (2009), supra note 2, at 16-17.
56 Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 46.
57 See id.
58 Id.
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likely to defer to testimony that is essentially "black box" evidence,
questions and conclusions with nothing comprehensible in between. The
broader the definition of the relevant universe of experts, the more
likely it is that parties can find experts with impressive r6sum6s to
exaggerate the certainty of their conclusions.
A fifth source of tension between science and law, one suggested
by another item on Haack's list, is that many scientific questions often
require input from multiple researchers using multiple methods before
scientists can reach a strong consensus. 59 In many situations, a one-off
study produced for purposes of litigation will not be very compelling.
To be sure, some questions may be adequately answered by a single
well-done study. Suppose a manufacturer of bullet-resistant glass
claimed that its glass can stop particular types of bullets fired by
particular types of guns. Assume that a claim of false advertising under
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) is brought against the manufacturer. A welldone laboratory test could probably provide an adequate assessment of
the manufacturer's claim. The result would not, of course, be final.
Perhaps even this hypothetical test warrants replication, but it should be
possible to reach a consensus about the glass's protective capacity with
a small number of properly conducted studies. 60 It should not take
dozens or hundreds of studies, nor should it take years or decades of
research.
Unlike the bullet-resistant glass example, which could be studied
under carefully controlled laboratory conditions, other research
questions are not so easy to answer because it is more difficult to
control the many variables of interest. In Annex Books, Judge
Easterbrook said there was reason to "doubt that Linz's work is the last
word" about the relationship between adult businesses and crime. 61 He
added that "a multivariate regression would provide a better foundation
than either a time series or a geographic cross-section." 62 Perhaps a
multivariate regression would have provided a better foundation, but
regression analysis is not the be-all and end-all of social science, and it
59Hack notes the potential need for "interlocking pieces of evidence" from different studies, but
also how the rules of evidence may render the individual studies inadmissible. Haack (2009),
supra note 2, at 18. See also Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the
Atomism ofDaubert, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 253 (2008).
60For an example where a single independent test may be inadequate, see Outdoor Techs., Inc. v.

Vinyl Visions, LLC, No. 06-cv-044, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73337, at *1l-17 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
29, 2006). This case dealt with the alleged falsity of an advertising claim that a vinyl fence was
the "most weatherable" fence on the market and therefore the most resistant to yellowing. The
standards for testing the outdoor weathering of plastics recommend using tests in several different
locations. See ASTM D1435-05 Standard Practice for Outdoor Weathering of Plastics, ASTM

INT'L, http://www.astm.org/Standards/DI435.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
61Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 2009).
62

Id
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too would not be the "last word." 63 There are many variables relevant
to crime rates near adult entertainment businesses and many ways to
model and test the relationship, few of which are likely to involve
laboratory controls. For obvious reasons, there are no Truman Showtype studies of the causal relationship between adult businesses and
crime. 64 It seems highly unlikely that even a single well-done study
could offer a compelling answer. At best, such a study would just be a
start. In contrast to the bullet-resistant glass example, doubts about the
results of any one study of the relationship between adult businesses and
crime should be almost automatic, even if the one study was well done.
Similarly, there are numerous issues to consider in designing a
study to test the relationship between video game violence and
aggression (or other negative effects): What type of study should be
conducted? Experimental studies are better at demonstrating causation,
but longitudinal studies are better at showing long-term effects. Or will
a cross-sectional study suffice? What constitutes a valid definition of
violence? How will violence be operationalized? Specifically, what
violent game will be used? Does the context of the violence in the
game matter? Does it matter, for example, whether the perpetrators of
violence are rewarded or punished? Whether the violence is cartoonish
or realistic looking? Whether the violence is sanitized or graphic?
Whether the violence takes place in a fantasy setting or a real-world
setting? What non-violent game will be used as a control? Is the nonviolent game equivalent in all respects to the violent game except with
regard to the violence? If not, do the differences matter? And what is a
valid definition of aggression? How will it be operationalized? No one
study can address all of these questions and the many other questions
relevant to understanding the effects of video game violence. Multiple
studies are needed to establish a relationship. Even more studies are
needed to flesh out a blunt conclusion that video game violence causes
aggression by examining the various contexts in which violence is
presented and the relative harm that may result from violence in these
different contexts. Many, many studies are needed to establish the "last
word." There are in fact many studies on the effects of media violence
and video game violence-though still not enough to justify the
restrictions on video games sought by legislators.

63See, e.g., David A. Freedman, Statistical Models and Shoe Leather, 21 Soc. METHODOLOGY

291, 293 (1991) (discussing "examples of good empirical work and strategies for research that do
not involve regression").
64Nor are there any for media violence effects, of course. See ANDERSON, GENTILE &
BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 15.
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II. VIDEO GAME VIOLENCE IN COURT

Concerns about video game violence are almost as old as the video
game industry. In 1976, a few years after the industry established itself
with the release of Pong, Exidy released the first controversial video
game, Death Race. The artwork on the game's cabinet featured a pair
of Grim Reapers racing two small convertibles through a cemetery, and
the object was for one or two players to run down pedestrians with their
cars. The instructions defined the pedestrians as gremlins, but the
primitive graphics of the time meant they were little more than stick
figures. Upon hitting one of these gremlins, a piercing sound would be
heard (perhaps the scream of a gremlin) and a cross would appear to
mark the deceased gremlin's grave. The National Safety Council
denounced the game as "sick, sick, sick. "65 Some local authorities
denounced it too.66 One arcade owner said he refused to carry the game
because it was "just too gory." 67
Many years later, video games finally caught up to the earlier
denunciations of Death Race and actually became gory. Most notably,
in 1992 Midway Manufacturing released MortalKombat, a blockbuster
game using digitized martial artists and particularly violent finishing
moves, or "Fatalities." 68 Probably the most famous--or notorious-of
these Fatalities involved the character Sub-Zero pulling the head off of a
defeated opponent with his or her spine still attached. Owing to its
popularity and violent content, Mortal Kombat became a showcase title
at the December 9, 1993 United States Senate hearings on video game
violence organized by Senators Joseph Lieberman and Herb Kohl. SubZero even performed his spine rip for the committee (on video tape).
Senator Lieberman made clear at the end of the hearing that he would
pursue government regulation of the industry, which the industry could
avoid only through self-regulation. 69 The outcome of these hearings
was the video game industry's creation of the Entertainment Software
65 'Sick, Sick, Sick, 'NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 54.
66See Larry Young, Local Safety Authorities Denounce Game, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane,
Wash.), Dec. 29, 1976, at 10.
67Martha Schiff, Electronic 'Killer' Game Spurned by Area Parlors,EVENING NEWS (Newburg,
New York), Dec. 31, 1976, at 3A.
68See, e.g., Editorial, A Mortal Blow to Child's Play, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 21, 1993, at 18
("Remember when you used to hope those nice, innocent video games would distract your
children from the violence on television? Those days are gone. Meet Mortal Kombat, a video
game that puts new levels of violence onto television and makes network shows look tame.");
Mike Snider, Graphic Violence Escalates on High-Tech Video Games, USA TODAY, June 4,
1993, at 3D ("Mortal Kombat goes far beyond the carnage portrayed by its predecessor, Street
Fighter II.").
69See Hearingon Video Game Violence, S. Governmental Affairs & Judiciary Subcomms., 103d
Cong. (1993), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/52848-1 (C-SPAN DVD,
Program ID 52848-1).
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Rating Board ("ESRB"). 70
The creation of the ESRB kept the government at bay for only so
long, and within less than a decade after the 1993 Senate hearings,
legislative concerns about video game violence led to a series of
enactments to restrict minors' access to violent video games. Table 1
lists the various enactments and the key judicial decisions addressing
their constitutionality. All of these enactments were directed at
violence. Some were directed at sexual content too,7 ' but only the
challenges to restrictions on violent video games are presently of
interest. The penalties for violating these statutes ranged in severity.
Minnesota sought only a twenty-five-dollar fine for violations. 72
Louisiana imposed a penalty ranging from one hundred to two thousand
dollars, possibly accompanied by up to one year in prison "with or
without hard labor." 73 Although the two earliest district court decisions
upheld the local ordinances before them, 74 these decisions were
reversed on appeal, and the remaining decisions resulted in defeats for
the government and victories for the video game industry. The
Supreme Court finally weighed in with a decision in June 2011, where it
held that California's video game violence law violated the First
Amendment, probably settling the matter for the foreseeable future.75
70 See STEVEN L. KENT, THE ULTIMATE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES 466-80 (2001); John

Burgess, Video Game Industry Plans Rating System; Move is Response to Congressional

Pressure,WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1993, at Fl.
71See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001) ("We are
not concerned with the part of the Indianapolis ordinance that concerns sexually graphic
expression."); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
("The Act regulates the distribution of both sexually explicit video games and ultra violent
explicit video games to those under the age of 17. The plaintiffs only challenge the second part of
the Act dealing with ultra violent explicit video games."); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The plaintiffs, associations representing video game
manufacturers and retailers, successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois Sexually
Explicit Video Game Law in the district court. . . . Primarily because we conclude that the
Sexually Explicit Video Game Law is not sufficiently narrowly tailored, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.").
72See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1067 (D. Minn. 2006), aff'd sub
nom. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008).
73Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 838 (M.D. La. 2006).
74 See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1141 (E.D.
Mo. 2002) ("Accordingly, the Court finds, based on the evidence in the record, that plaintiffs
failed to show that St. Louis County Ordinance No. 20,193 (Oct. 26, 2000) . . . is unconstitutional
and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, plaintiffs' summary
judgment motion is denied."), rev'd 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n
v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 981 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("The plaintiffs have not shown they are
reasonably likely to succeed on their claims that the Indianapolis Ordinance violates the First
Amendment or is unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction is denied."), revd 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
75The Supreme Court did leave at least one potential opening for additional legislation
independent of any developments in the scientific literature. In footnote 3, the Court suggested a
state might be allowed to set up a list of children not allowed to purchase violent video games,
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With the exception of Oklahoma, which chose to rest its argument on
"common sense," 76 the state or local governments in all of these
lawsuits relied on the scientific evidence about the effects of video
game violence to justify their laws.
Date
July 10, 2000

Table 1: Enacted Legislation
Jurisdiction
Measure
City of
General
Indianapolis/
Ordinance
Marion
No. 72-2000
County

and Key Judicial Decisions
Decision(s)
American Amusement Machine Ass'n v.
Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000),
rev'd 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001)

October 26,
2000

St. Louis
County,
Missouri

County
Ordinance
No. 20,193

Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis
County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002),
rev'd 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003)

May 20, 2003

Washington

House Bill
1009

Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, No.
03-1245 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2003); Video
Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp.
2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004)

July 25, 2005

Illinois

Public Act
94-0315

Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich,
404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff'd 469
F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006)

September 14,
2005

Michigan

Public Act
108

Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 404
F.Supp. 2d 978 (E.D. Mich. 2005);
Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426
F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006)

October 7, 2005

California

Assembly
Bill 1179

May 31, 2006

Minnesota

Senate File
785

Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D.
Cal. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Schwarzenegger, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472,
No. 05-4188 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), aff'd 556
F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011)
Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F.
Supp. 2d 1065 (8th Cir. 2008), affd sub nom.
Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519
F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008)

June 9, 2006

Oklahoma

House Bill
3004

Entertainment Merchants Ass'n v. Henry, No.
06-675, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69139, 2007 WL
2743097 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007)

June 15, 2006

Louisiana

Act 441

Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F.
Suno. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006)

provided that it only included the names of children whose parents put them on the list. See
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct 2729, 2736 n.3 (2011).
76Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69139, at *17
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007); Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
and Br. in Support, Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, at 9 (Oct. 27, 2006) ("Plaintiffs' contention that
there is no psychological study that validates harm to children is misplaced. . . . Common sense
would dictate that playing a game where you can 'curb stomp' people or kill them with glass
shards, or suffocate them with plastic bags (Manhunt) by controlling a joystick is not good for
children.") (italics added).
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The video game violence litigation presents a good opportunity to
examine the use of science in the courts in a situation where at least
some of the common tensions between science and the law identified by
Professor Haack were of less concern. In the remaining part of this
Article, I first look at the video game violence cases in the lower courts,
focusing on three interrelated categories of translation challenges: (1)
identifying the research questions addressed by the scientific literature
on media violence, (2) selecting the literature to provide to the courts,
and (3) explaining the science to the courts. I then look at how the
Supreme Court addressed the science.
How did the courts, including the lawyers, do? The record is
mixed, suggesting that even easier cases for dealing with scientific
evidence still present significant challenges for the courts. Perhaps the
most challenging problem was reducing a large scientific literature into
something manageable but still useful. The cases do illustrate one
possibility for modest improvement, however. The judge that most
thoroughly considered the scientific evidence is the one that held a trial
on the merits, thereby reducing the role of the attorneys as translators
and giving the judge a potentially valuable opportunity to interact with
the expert witnesses. While a trial is not the only procedural vehicle for
trial court judges to interact with experts, the judges in the remaining
cases apparently did not make use of these other opportunities. Judges
may be well advised to take advantage of the opportunities when they
arise, a conclusion reinforced by studies finding that jurors are often
capable of dealing with scientific evidence in the context of a trial. 77
Justice Breyer proposed an alternative solution to the challenges
that the courts faced in dealing with the scientific evidence in the video
game violence cases: defer to the legislature. 78 He offered no evidence
for the legislature's superiority in analyzing scientific evidence, either
scientific evidence generally or the video game violence literature
A preliminary review of the legislative history in
specifically.
California suggests that Breyer's faith in the legislature was
misplaced. 79 Legislatures face translation challenges too. In my view,
the First Amendment interests at stake in these cases outweighed the
speculative possibility that a legislature is better able to assess scientific
77 See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries, 91 JUDICATURE 226, 227 (2008)
("Jurors' individual and collective recall and comprehension of evidence are substantial. Jurors
critically evaluate the content and consistency of testimony provided by both lay and expert
witnesses, and do not appear to rubber stamp expert conclusions."). See also Valerie P. Hans,
Judges, Juries,and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 19 (2007); Richard Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed.,

Brookings Inst. 1993).
78 See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2770 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79 See infra Part II.B.
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evidence than the courts.
A. The Lower Courts

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, there were open
questions about the appropriate standard for assessing the
constitutionality of the various laws restricting access to violent video
games. The more deferential the standard, the less thoroughly the
courts needed to review the scientific evidence. Strict scrutiny is the
toughest standard. When a restriction on speech is subject to strict
scrutiny, the law must be "justified by a compelling government
interest" and it must be "narrowly drawn to serve that interest."80
Additionally, "[t]he State must specifically identify an 'actual problem'
in need of solving, and the curtailment of free speech must be actually
necessary to the solution."81 But prior to Brown, it was plausible that
the Supreme Court might impose a lower standard. In Ginsbergv. New
York, 82 a case involving the sale of "'girlie' magazines" to a minor in
violation of New York law, 83 the Court upheld a statute that prohibited
the sale to minors of sexually explicit material that "(i) predominantly
appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is
patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is
utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." 84 The New
York legislature believed that sexually explicit publications are harmful
to minors. The Supreme Court did not require scientific certainty that
the legislature was right.85 The Court did not even require a scientific
consensus. The Court did refer to a consensus among commentators,
but the consensus was that the scientific evidence was ambiguous, not
that sexually explicit publications are harmful to minors. 86
Where Ginsberg applies, the legislature only needs a rational basis
for its belief that prohibited materials cause harm to minors, thereby
allowing material to be deemed obscene for minors-even though not
obscene for adults-under what is sometimes described as Ginsberg's
variable obscenity standard. 87 Whether any scientific evidence is
8 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.

81Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)).
82Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
83Id. at 631.
84Id. at 633, 646.
85See id at 642-43.
86See id. at 642.

87See id. at 641 ("To sustain state power to exclude material defined as obscenity by § 484-h
requires only that we be able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that
exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors."). See also Interactive
Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Ginsberg . . .
invokes the much less exacting 'rational basis' standard of review.").
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required under Ginsberg is not clear. Maybe a common-sense view that
the category of speech at issue is plausibly considered obscene for
minors is sufficient. Or maybe the legislature also needs some scientific
evidence, and Ginsberg allows legislatures to resolve any reasonable
disagreement among scientists about the meaning of the evidence,
thereby leaving courts with the responsibility to just confirm the
existence of reasonable disagreement among scientists.
For the most part, the courts refused to extend Ginsberg'svariable
obscenity standard to violent content. In Kendrick the Seventh Circuit
allowed for the possibility that violent imagery might be obscene, but
the court did not think the video games submitted in that case could
plausibly qualify, nor did the government attempt to defend its
ordinance on this basis.88 Some of Judge Posner's language suggested
that the court was applying Ginsberg'sstandard, but ultimately the court
held that the grounds for restricting minors' access to video games
"must be compelling and not merely plausible," 89 which is the language
of strict scrutiny, not rational basis review. 90 Other courts more
explicitly rejected Ginsberg's applicability to violent media.9t Except
88 See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001).
89 Id. at 576 (emphasis added). Cf Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1076 (N.D. 1I. 2005) ("As the Seventh Circuit made clear in Kendrick, however, 'violence and
obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable depiction,' subject to different levels of
scrutiny.").
90 Kendrick does not contain an explicit reference to "strict scrutiny." See Kendrick, 244 F.3d.
572.
91See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 960 n.14 (9th Cir. 2009)
("We also reject the State's more general request that we equate violent content with unprotected
'obscenity."'), af'd sub nom. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011);
InteractiveDigital Software Ass 'n, 329 F.3d at 959 ("In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court recognized

that the government could legitimately regulate sexually explicit material that is obscene as to
minors but not obscene as to adults. But Ginsberg did not involve protected speech (like the
speech at issue in this case) . . . .") (internal citation omitted); Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry,
No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69139, at * I1(W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007) ("The
Ginsberg decision, however, concerned only sexually explicit or 'obscene' material, which is
unprotected by the First Amendment, rather than the protected expression at issue in this case....
Defendants may not rely on Ginsberg as authorizing the enhanced restrictions of the Act on
dissemination to minors.") (emphasis omitted); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d
823, 836 (M.D. La. 2006) ("While a 'harmful to minors' analysis has been used by the Supreme
Court to uphold regulation of obscene material harmful to minors, this does not mean that the
same considerations apply in the context of 'violent video games."'); Entm't Software Ass'n v.
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652 (E.D. Mich. 2006) ("This court finds the Ginsberg test
inapplicable to the ultra-violent explicit section of the Act."); Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at
1076 (rejecting Ginsberg's applicability to violence on the basis of Kendrick). In Video Software
Dealers Ass 'n v. Maleng, the district court did not need to resolve the Ginsberg question, but it
left open the possibility that certain violent imagery might qualify as obscene. Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("[I]t is reasonable to
ask whether a state may ever impose a ban on the dissemination of video games to children under
18. The answer is 'probably yes' if the games contain sexually explicit images, and 'maybe' if
the games contain violent images, such as torture or bondage, that appeal to the prurient interest
of minors.") (internal citations omitted).
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for the two district courts that were overruled on appeal, 92 the lower
courts generally agreed that restrictions on minors' access to violent
video games are content-based restrictions on speech subject to strict
scrutiny. The government defendants therefore needed to demonstrate
that the restrictions on speech served a compelling state interest and
were narrowly tailored to serve that interest.93
The scientific research was relevant to the analysis in these cases
because the government needed to show that the harm to minors was
"real" and "not merely conjectural" and that the restrictions would "in
fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way." 94 At the same
.time the lower courts applied strict scrutiny, however, some courts also
said that the legislatures' judgments only need to be based on
"substantial evidence," 95 a standard calling for "substantial deference"
to the predictions of the legislatures. 96 This deference was in name
only. In its second case dealing with violent video game legislation, the
Eighth Circuit actually demanded scientific certainty of the harm caused
92See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1141 (E.D.
Mo. 2002) ("The Court finds that plaintiffs failed to meet this burden of showing that video
games are a protected form of speech under the First Amendment."), rev'd 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir.
2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("In
short, the Ordinance reflects a careful, reasonable, and limited extension of the principles applied
in Ginsberg to protect children from pornography."), rev'd244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
93 See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958; Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 771
(8th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir.
2003); Henry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69139, at *10; Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 831; Granholm, 426
F. Supp. 2d at 651-52; Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
94 Schwarzenegger,556 F.3d at 962 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994) (plurality opinion)); accord Swanson, 519 F.3d at 771; Interactive DigitalSoftware Ass'n,

329 F.3d at 958; Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. Although this particular language comes from
Turner, which involved intermediate rather than strict scrutiny (according to Brown), equivalent
language can be found in Brown: "The State must specifically identify an 'actual problem' in
need of solving, and the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution."
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (citations omitted).
95See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 967 ("Under strict scrutiny, the State has not produced
substantial evidence that supports the Legislature's conclusion that violent video games cause
psychological or neurological harm to minors."); Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n, 329 F.3d at
959 ("[T]he County has failed to present the 'substantial supporting evidence' of harm that is
required before an ordinance that threatens protected speech can be upheld."); Henry, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69139, at *16-17 ("Where the challenged legislation restricts or limits freedom of
speech, however, the courts must ensure that the legislature's judgments are based on reasonable
inferences drawn from substantial evidence."); Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 ("Where the
challenged legislation restricts or limits freedom of speech, however, the courts must ensure that
the legislature's judgments are based on reasonable inferences drawn from substantial
evidence."). But see Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (D. Minn.
2006) (finding Turner inapposite because Turner was an application of intermediate scrutiny).
96See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("This obligation to exercise independent
judgment when First Amendment rights are implicated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de
novo, or to replace Congress' factual predictions with our own. Rather, it is to assure that, in
formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence.").
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by video game violence. 97 No other court went this far and some courts,
like the Ninth Circuit, said that strict scrutiny does not require scientific
certainty. 98 But even these courts were not deferring to the legislatures.
There is an obvious tension between the deference of the substantialevidence standard and the lack of deference of the strict-scrutiny
standard, but the lower courts did not dwell on this problem. Even
though most courts did not demand scientific certainty, they still
scrutinized the evidence; they did not defer to the legislatures. The
Supreme Court eventually validated this lack of deference in Brown,
which rejected an obligation to defer to legislative predictions under the
substantial evidence standard. 99
1. Identifying the Research Questions
The courts agreed that evidence was needed, not just common
sense or genuine scientific disagreement. But evidence of what,
precisely? The government defendants initially had to decide what
interest or interests they would offer to justify their restrictions on
minors' access to violent video games. They then needed to provide
evidence in support of these interests, which in the present set of cases
meant evidence of harmful effects of video game violence. While
media violence scholars vary in how they break down the possible
effects of media violence and what terms they use to describe these
effects, the literature emphasizes three general categories of effects
potentially caused by media violence: (1) increased aggression or an
"aggressor effect," (2) desensitization towards violence or a "bystander
effect," and (3) increased fear of violence or a "victim effect."' 0
Researchers point to at least fourteen specific effects, most of which are

97 See Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772 (referring to a requirement of "statistical certainty of causation"
and "incontrovertible proof of a causal relationship").
98See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 964 ("Although we do not require the State to demonstrate a
'scientific certainty,' the State must come forward with more than it has."); see also Maleng, 325
F. Supp. 2d at 1188-89 ("Although 'we do not demand of legislatures scientifically certain
criteria of legislation,' given the state of the existing research in this area, the Court finds that the
Legislature's belief that video games cause violence, particularly violence against law
enforcement officers, is not based on reasonable inferences drawn from substantial evidence.")
(internal citation omitted).
99 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 ("Rather, relying upon our decision in Turner Broad Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), the State claims that it need not produce such proof because the
legislature can make a predictive judgment that such a link exists, based on competing
psychological studies. But reliance on Turner Broadcastingis misplaced. That decision applied
intermediatescrutiny to a content-neutral regulation.") (parallel citations omitted).
100Douglas A. Gentile & Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video Games: The Newest Media Violence
Hazard, in MEDIA VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN 131, 133-34 (Douglas A. Gentile ed., Praeger
2003). See also Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 23; W. JAMES POTTER, THE 11
MYTHS OF MEDIA VIOLENCE 29 (2003) [hereinafter POTTER (2003)]; POTTER (1999), supra note

5, at 25-26, 135-37.
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probably variations on the three just mentioned.' 0 The aggressor effect
can be broken down into at least three more specific subcategories,
including aggressive thoughts, aggressive feelings, and aggressive
behavior.102 Aggressive behavior can include physical aggression,
verbal aggression, and relational aggression, the latter referring to things
like spreading rumors with the intent to harm another person. 0 3 Within
the video game violence literature, there is probably more research on
aggressive behavior than the other effects.104
The government defendants in these cases described the state
interests in different ways, but they often referred to protecting the
psychological well-being of minors,105 an interest previously validated
by the Supreme Court.106 The defendants usually went beyond this
vague concern and also described the state interest, at least in part, as
preventing increased aggression, particularly aggressive behavior. 107 In
some courts, the defendants' claimed interest in preventing aggressive
behavior presented a problem under Brandenburg v. Ohio. 08 Under
Brandenburg,"The government may suppress speech for advocating the
use of force or a violation of law only if 'such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
101See Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 23; POTTER (1999), supra note 5, at 12335. An "appetite effect" is probably distinct from the three general effects listed above. It refers
to media violence causing an increased appetite for even more violent entertainment. See Gentile
& Anderson, supra note 100, at 134. Potter notes the need for more consistency in the
terminology used by media violence researchers for these various effects. See POTTER (1999),
supra note 5, at 137. I agree with Potter.
102 See ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 57; Gentile, Saleem & Anderson,
supra note 5, at 23-24.
103 See ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 13-14.
104 See Craig A. Anderson, Akiko Shibuya, Nobuko Ihori, Edward L. Swing, Bard J. Bushman,
Akira Sakamoto, Hannah R. Rothstein & Muniba Saleem, Violent Video Game Effects on
Aggression, Empathy, and Prosocial Behavior in Eastern and Western Countries: A MetaAnalytic Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 151, 160 tbl.3 (2010).
105 See, e.g., Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2008)
("safeguarding both the psychological well-being and the moral and ethical development of
minors"); Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003)
("protecting the 'psychological well-being of minors').
106 See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("We have recognized
that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors.").
107 See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 958-59 ("aggressive behavior in the
immediate situation [and] aggressive thoughts"); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244
F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001) ("aggressive attitudes and behavior, which might lead to violence");
Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (M.D. La. 2006) ("curbing violent
behavior"); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
("violent, aggressive, and asocial behavior"); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp.
2d 1051, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (aggressive behavior and feelings); Video Software Dealers Ass'n
v. Maleng, 325 F.2d 1180, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("violence and aggression toward law
enforcement officers").
10 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 961 n.15 (9th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).
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In Entertainment Software Ass'n v.

Granholm, as one example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan held that Michigan's restrictions on
disseminating certain violent video games to minors failed under the
Brandenburg standard because there was no evidence that video game
violence causes imminent violence in the real world. 0 While Michigan
made references to what might have been presented as separate
interests, including preventing aggressive thoughts and feelings, it
emphasized only aggressive behavior as the state's interest (unless
preventing aggressive thoughts and feelings was supposed to fall under
the separate and more general heading of protecting minors'
psychological well-being).'
Maybe other interests besides preventing
aggressive behavior could have made it past the court's initial analysis
under Brandenburg. While Michigan might still have lost in the district
court even if it passed the Brandenburghurdle,"l2 the failure of the state
to carefully present the multiple and separate findings of the scientific
literature about different effects weakened its argument.
California tried to avoid similar problems under Brandenburg,but
in doing so, the state muddled its claimed interest in restricting minors'
access to violent video games. California's Assembly Bill 1179, the
Act later at issue before the Supreme Court, explicitly referenced
concerns about "violent antisocial or aggressive behavior."" 3 Unlike
some other courts, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California did not think the interest of preventing aggressive
behavior presented a problem under Brandenburg.'14 On appeal before
the Ninth Circuit, California's brief explicitly mentioned concerns about
aggressive behavior and even discussed studies dealing with aggressive
behavior." 5 During the oral argument, however, Judge Consuelo
109Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
447).
110See Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 652.

111See id. at 649; Defendants' Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Granholm, 426 F. Supp.
2d 646 (No. 05-73634).
112See Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 652 ("Even if the Act satisfied the Brandenburg

requirements, the State has failed to support its claims by 'substantial evidence."'). See also Foti,
451 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (referring to the state's interest in preventing psychological harm as
"impermissible thought control").
113Assemb. B. 1179 § 1, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) ("The Legislature finds and declares all
of the following: . . . The state has a compelling interest in preventing violent, aggressive, and
antisocial behavior, and in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors who play
violent video games.").
114See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57472, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), aff'd 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), affdsub nom.
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
115Appellants' Opening Brief at 24-37, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556
F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-16620), 2008 WL 412514, aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Entm't
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Callahan asked Deputy Attorney General Zackery Morazzini if
California had "abandoned" its argument about an interest in
"preventing violent aggressive and antisocial behavior."ll 6 Morazzini
inexplicably responded that California had never even raised this
argument.17 While his answer was somewhat unclear, he did clearly
say that one of California's interests was preventing aggressive thoughts
and some other effects like desensitization, but he seemed to disclaim a
state interest in preventing aggressive behavior." 8 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that California was no longer asserting an interest in
preventing "violent, aggressive, and antisocial" behavior.1 9 The
discussion of the various forms of aggression in California's brief did
not carefully distinguish between the scientific evidence related to
aggressive behavior and the scientific evidence related to aggressive
thoughts and feelings, thereby making California's entire discussion of
aggression seem irrelevant under its stated interests.120
While the government defendants were sometimes vague or
unclear about the interests at stake, the relevant literature is largely
about violence and aggression.
Courts therefore needed to be
particularly attentive to how media violence researchers define these
concepts. Violence and aggression can be defined broadly or narrowly.
Media violence researchers usually define both broadly. Gentile,
Saleem, and Anderson define these terms as follows:
Media violence refers to media depictions of aggressive and violent
behavior directed at characters in the media story. Those characters
can be human or nonhuman, cartoonish or visually realistic.
Fictional, unrealistic, or animated violence is still considered
violence if it meets the above definitions.121
Human aggression researchers define aggression as (a) a behavior
that is intended to harm another individual, (b) the behavior is
expected by the perpetrator to have some chance of actually harming
that individual, and (c) the perpetrator believes that the target
Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
116 See Oral Argument at 3:30, Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (No. 07-16620); Schwarzenegger,

556 F.3d at 961 (referring to some "early confusion" about what compelling interests California
was relying upon).
117 See Oral Argument at 3:45, Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (No. 07-16620).
li Seeid.
119 See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 961 (discussing the confusion). Cf Brief of Respondents at

38, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3535053 at
*38 ("California has largely disclaimed a violence-prevention rationale .... Instead, California
focuses on a more amorphous harm-causing increased 'aggressive thoughts and behavior' in
minors.").
120 For the discussion of aggression in California's brief, see Appellants' Opening Brief, supra
note 115, at 28-34.
121Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 17.
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individual is motivated to avoid the harm. Violence typically is
defined by behavioral scientists as physical aggression that is so
severe that the target is likely to suffer serious physical injury. 122
Other media violence researchers have used broader definitions. Some,
for example, define violence to include acts against inanimate objects,
verbal acts, accidents, and acts of nature. 123 The quoted definitions,
however, are fair representations of the media violence literature.
A common view among researchers is that the public defines
media violence too narrowly because the public focuses on whether
violence is graphic and therefore discounts violence that is sanitized. 124
The public also ignores violence when it is humorous.125 Cartoon
violence is largely unnoticed by the public even though "cartoons are
consistently rated as the most violent programs on television." 26 In
referring to cartoon violence, media violence researchers are not
thinking about only adult-oriented animation with graphic violence.
According to Professor W. James Potter, "A social scientist who
watches a cartoon such as Tom and Jerry sees many violent actions that
are in a sanitized contextual pattern and knows that this context
increases the likelihood that viewers will become desensitized." 27
(Surprisingly, given the differences between media violence researchers
and the public, researchers sometimes rely on subjects' self-reports of
exposure to media violence.128)
Unlike the public, media violence researchers see potentially
harmful violence almost everywhere. Media violence researchers
Haejung Paik and George Comstock conclude that if the measures of
aggression in the literature are valid, then "very few" television
programs can be considered harmless. 129 Media violence researchers
often hold similarly broad views of violence in video games. Space
Invaders (1978), Pac-Man (1980),

and Ms. Pac-Man (1981)

are

violent.130 Zaxxon (1982) is both "somewhat violent" and "highly
122Id at 16-17 (citations omitted). See also ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at
13.
123See POTTER (1999), supranote 5, at 64-73.

124See id. at 73-74; Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 17; ANDERSON, GENTILE &
BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 99; POTTER (2003), supra note 100, at 92-95; POTTER (1999), supra

note 5, at 73-74.
125POTTER (2003), supra note 100, at 93-94.
126Karyn Riddle, Keren Eyal, Chad Mahood & W. James Potter, Judging the Degree of Violence
in Media Portrayals:A Cross-GenreComparison, 50 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA
270, 282 (2006).
127POTTER (1999), supra note 5, at 75-76.
128See, e.g., ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supranote 4, at 81-82, 99.
129Haejung Paik & George Comstock, The Effects of Television Violence on AntisocialBehavior:
A Meta-Analysis, 21 COMM. RES. 516, 537-38 (1994).
130See Steven B. Silvern & Peter A. Williamson, The Effects of Video Game Play on Young
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aggressive." 1 31 According to Anderson, "the seemingly innocuous
Super Mario Brothers games included the capacity to destroy harmful
creatures ... by jumping on top of them or by throwing fireballs at
them." 32 A 2001 study of E-rated games ("Everyone") found that
sixty-four percent contain acts of intentional violence.133 A similar
study in 2004 found that ninety-eight percent of T-rated ("Teen") games
contain violence.134
Media violence researchers are not always consistent in defining
violence with broad definitions that are neutral about whether the
violence is graphic. Anderson, Gentile, and Buckley claim "video
games didn't become very violent until the early 1990s."s35 Elsewhere,
Anderson claims "[t]ruly violent video games came of age in the 1990s
with the killing games Mortal Kombat, Street Fighter, and Wolfenstein

3D." 36 It is difficult to square these statements with the definitions of
violence and aggression above. Based on those definitions, many older
games contain more violence than more recent and more controversial
games from the 1990s to the present. Modem games with stories like
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas (2004)137 contain fewer acts of violence

than early and very repetitious games like Galaxian (1979)138 and
Galaga (1981).139 Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas includes breaks from

the violence where the player is doing other things. Galaxian and
Galaga do not. One study calculates that "the percentage of game play
depicting violence" in both Galaxian and Galaga is one hundred

Children's Aggression, Fantasy, and Prosocial Behavior, 8 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 453 (1987) (describing Space Invaders as violent); Joseph R. Dominick, Videogames,
Television Violence, andAggression in Teenagers, 34 J. CoMM. 136, 137 (1984) (describing PacMan, M. Pac-Man, Space Invaders, Defender, Asteroids, and Donkey Kong as "games in which
the players performed acts that are violent in nature"). Cf Joel Cooper & Diane Mackie, Video
Games and Aggression in Children, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 726, 731 (1986) (describing
Pac-Man as a low-aggression game as compared to Missile Command).
131Craig A. Anderson & Catherine M. Ford, Affect of the Game Player: Short-Term Effects of
Highly and Mildly Aggressive Video Games, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 390, 395
(1986).
132Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings,and Behaviors,
in CHILDREN IN THE DIGITAL AGE 101, 101 (Sandra L. Calvert et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Anderson (2002)].
133 Kimberly M. Thompson & Kevin Haninger, Violence in E-Rated Video Games, 286 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 591, 594 (2001).
134Kevin Haninger, M. Seamus Ryan & Kimberly M. Thompson, Violence in Teen-Rated Video
Games, 6 MEDSCAPE GEN. MED., Mar. 12, 2004, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC 1140725.
13s ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 16.
136Anderson (2002), supra note 132, at 102.
137See GRAND THEFT AUTO: SAN ANDREAS (Rockstar Games 2004) (Sony PlayStation 2 game).
See also GRAND THEFT AUTO: SAN ANDREAS (Rockstar Games 2005) (Microsoft Xbox game).
138See GALAXIAN (Midway Manufacturing Co. 1979).
139 See GALAGA (Midway Manufacturing Co. 1981).
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percent. 14 0 Whatever the percentage is for Grand Theft Auto: San
Andreas, it is not one hundred percent.
Despite the apparent inconsistencies, the general sweep of the
media violence literature goes well beyond describing as violent only
the narrow class of graphically violent games usually targeted by the
government. By focusing on graphic violence, the various attempts by
the government to restrict minors' access to violent video games track
the public's definition of violence rather than the usual, broader
definitions used by media violence researchers. If one is persuaded by
the media violence literature, then the justification for focusing legal
restrictions on graphic violence alone is not clear. It could be
counterproductive by reinforcing the view that non-graphic, sanitized
violence is not harmful. Professor Potter actually ties an increase in
graphic violence to a decrease in aggressiveness in viewers (but an
increase in desensitization).141 Whether focusing on graphic violence
makes sense depends on the outcome of research that goes beyond the
basic question of whether media violence causes aggression (and other
effects) and instead considers the relative effects of violence in different
contexts.
At the same time the media violence literature takes a broad
approach to violence, it accepts that the context of the violence likely
matters: "[N]ot all violent portrayals are equal with regard to the risk
they might pose."l 42 The context of violence likely matters even more
than its frequency. 143 The literature recognizes, however, that there are
many unresolved questions about the possible ways in which context
matters. Games portray violence in many different ways and in many
different contexts. There is therefore a need to figure out the potentially
harmful effects of many contextual factors in violent games, such as
whether the violence is rewarded or punished, cartoonish or realistic,
sanitized or graphic, and so on.144 One recent study contains a
remarkable acknowledgment about the limitations of the media violence
140See Thompson & Haninger, supra note 133, at 596.
141See POTTER (2003), supra note 100, at 149 ("Notice how some factors work in opposite
directions.").
142 1 NATIONAL TELEVISION VIOLENCE STUDY, supra note 43, at 19.

See also Christopher P.

Barlett et al., The Effect of the Amount of Blood in a Violent Video Game on Aggression,
Hostility, and Arousal, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 539 (2008); Akiko Shibuya et al.,
The Effects of the Presence and Contexts of Video Game Violence on Children: A Longitudinal
Study in Japan, 39 SIMULATION & GAMING 528, 528 (2008); Nicholas L. Carnagey & Craig A.
Anderson, The Effects of Reward and Punishment in Violent Video Games on Aggressive Affect,
Cognition, and Behavior, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 882 (2005); POTTER (2003), supra note 100, at 14052.
143 See POTTER (2003), supra note 100, at 140-41 (arguing that "our primary concern about the
influence of media violence should be focused on context instead of frequency").
144 See id. at 140-48; POTTER (1999), supranote 5, at 31-36, 87-95.
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literature, given the confident claims about the effects of media violence
summarized at the very beginning of this Article: "[R]esearchers have
not yet answered a simple question: What kinds of violent video games
are problematic for children?"l 45 This acknowledgement calls attention
to a dimension of the media violence literature going beyond the general
question of whether media violence (broadly defined) causes aggression
(broadly defined). While there is research on the implications of
violence in various contexts, there is a broad range of variables that
could be tested, and the literature on any particular variable remains
limited, if it exists at all. 146 As for the effects of graphic violence in
particular, more research is needed. 147
Questions about what specific types of video game violence cause
aggression should have been of crucial interest to the courts. Usually,
they were not. The narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny calls
for the government to focus restrictions on the types of violent games
that cause harm. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington was attuned to this problem in Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng,148 but the Washington statute at issue focused

exclusively on video games where the players could engage in "realistic
or photographic-like depictions" of violence against human law
enforcement officers, even if not particularly graphic.149 The lack of
studies focusing on a specific relationship between video game violence
and attitudes or behavior directed towards law enforcement officers did
not escape the court's notice.o50 In general, however, the lower courts,
unlike the Supreme Court, did not focus on these types of contextual
issues.
2. Selecting the Literature
Understanding the media violence literature's basic research
questions, including the definitions of the key concepts, is just a first
145 Shibuya et al., supra note 142, at 528.
146 Professor Kevin Saunders notes that it would be at least difficult, and maybe impossible, for
the media violence literature to comprehensively study the effects of the many different
contextual variables that may increase, decrease, or nullify the harm that might otherwise be
caused by a depiction of violence. See KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY 44
(1996).
147 See Jeanne B. Funk et al., Rating Electronic Games: Violence Is in the Eye ofthe Beholder, 30

YOUTH & SOC'Y 283, 304 (1999) ("It appears that the assumption is made that the more realistic
human violence is the only type of violence that should be restricted. However, with respect to
the impact of electronic games, there are no data to support this assumption."); BARRIE GUNTER
ET AL., VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION 263 (2003) ("The extent to which prolonged and graphic

violence may stimulate a fear response, aggression, or a desensitization response is still uncertain
and requires further research.").
148 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
149 Id. at 1189-90.
15o See id.at 1188.
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step. Gentile and Anderson say scientists will only accept conclusions
about the effects of video game violence based on a broad research
literature relying on multiple methods of inquiry. 51 Scientists may
need to read a large portion of this literature to be convinced, but what
about judges? Attorneys cannot submit anything close to the entire
media violence literature or even the video game violence literature to
the courts. Even the selection of articles to submit to the courts
therefore presents a sort of translation challenge because lawyers
become a filter of the relevant scientific literature. Attorneys must
carefully decide which journal articles to include in the record, but there
are many to choose from.
Various meta-analyses provide a sense of the breadth of the
literature. A 1994 meta-analysis of television violence studies relied on
217 empirical studies.152 A 2003 estimate put the number of media
violence studies at about 300.153 As for studies of video game violence
specifically, Anderson relied on 44 studies in his 2004 meta-analysisl 54
(a joumal article discussed in several decisions15 5). A more recent 2010
meta-analysis co-authored by Anderson supersedes the 2004 study and
includes 136 studies. 156 Counting literature reviews as relevant studies
would add even more to the total. One could easily skim over the
citations to this literature in the lower courts' opinions and conclude that
there are only a handful of media violence studies worth reading. The
district court cited five studies in Entertainment Software Ass'n v.

Hatch, but it only discussed Anderson's 2004 meta-analysis at any
length. 157 The Seventh Circuit in Kendrick cited and discussed only one
article (which discusses two different research projects). 58 The Eighth
151See Douglas A. Gentile & Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video Games: The Effects on Youth,
and Public Policy Implications, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 225,
229 (Nancy E. Dowd et al. eds., 2006).
152Paik & Comstock, supra note 129, at 522.
153 POTTER (2003), supra note 100, at 29.
154See Anderson (2004), supra note 7, at 115. The count of forty-four studies is more easily
found in Craig A. Anderson, Akiko Shibuya, Nobuko Ihori, Edward L. Swing, Bard J. Bushman,
Akira Sakamoto, Hannah R. Rothstein & Muniba Saleem, Violent Video Game Effects on
Aggression, Empathy, and Prosocial Behavior in Eastern and Western Countries: A MetaAnalytic Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 151, 157 (2010).
155 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 963 (9th Cir. 2009);
Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2008); Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472, at *30-32
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069-70 (D.
Minn. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061-62 (N.D. Ill.
2005). Two of these decisions lack full citations to the article, but it is clear what the courts were
discussing.
156 See Anderson et al., supra note 104, at 157.
'57 See Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70.
15 See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2001)
(discussing Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts,

326

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 31:297

Circuit in Interactive DigitalSoftware Ass'n v. St. Louis County referred

to a "psychologist" who testified about "a recent study" before St. Louis
County, Missouri, the defendant.159 In EntertainmentSoftware Ass 'n v.
Swanson, the Eighth Circuit mentioned Anderson's 2004 meta-analysis
and the July 2000 Joint Statement referenced in the introduction to this
Article. The Eighth Circuit noted the Joint Statement's reference to
"well over 1000 studies," but the court gave no indication that one
would really need to go beyond Anderson's meta-analysis to assess the
literature.160 The Ninth Circuit discussed three studies, including
Anderson's 2004 meta-analysis, and a press release that describes some
additional research.161 No court was analyzing the entire literature on
media violence generally or video game violence specifically or
anything close to it.

It is difficult to imagine that such a slim literature review about a
difficult research question could persuade someone to rule in favor of
the government. Whether litigants could persuade a judge to read even
a dozen studies before ruling on a motion for an injunction or summary
judgment isn't clear. Whether the attorneys or judges would even think
it's necessary is also not clear, but there is reason to think Caudill and
LaRue's worry about science being idealized works against increasing
the quantity of submissions to a court and the willingness of judges to
read more. On an idealized view of science, one or two studies could
potentially do the job. After all, if the studies represent good science,
why would anyone need more? The submission of so few studies by
some defendants in these cases could be caused either by an idealized
view of science or by a belief that judges would not read more than a
couple of studies. The opinion in Hatch is suggestive of both problems.
In Hatch the district court issued a permanent injunction, later
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, against the enforcement of the
Minnesota Restricted Video Games Act of 2006.162 The Act called for a
fine of twenty-five dollars of anyone under seventeen who rents a video
game rated M ("Mature") or AO ("Adults Only") by the ERSB.163 The
court said that strict scrutiny applied to the Act.164 The state responded
that its compelling state interest was to protect the psychological wellbeing of minors and to promote the moral and ethical development of

Feelings, and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 772

(2000)). The court reports a slightly different title for the article.
159 Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 958-59 (8th Cir. 2003).
160See Swanson, 519 F.3d at 769-70.

161See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2009).
162See Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
163 Id

164Id at 1068.
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children.165 The court required the state to provide "substantial, actual
'empirical support' for its claim that the Act would protect minors
from psychological harm. 166 Minnesota submitted ten studies to the
district court, including Anderson's 2004 meta-analysis, and a list of the
studies relied upon by Anderson. The state also submitted three other
items, including the July 2000 Joint Statement, a resolution by the
American Psychological Association, and a press release from the
Indiana University School of Medicine.167 In the district court opinion,
the judge focused on Anderson's 2004 meta-analysis and very briefly
discussed and cited four of the other studies. 168 He did not cite or
discuss the remaining five studies.
In deciding that Anderson's meta-analysis was "far too slight to
bear the weight of the State's argument," 69 the judge added in a
footnote, "Dr. Anderson's meta-analysis seems to suggest that one can
take a number of studies, each of which he admits do not prove the
proposition in question, and 'stack them up' until a collective proof
emerges."l 70 It is fairly clear that the judge doubted the legitimacy of
meta-analytic techniques, but meta-analyses are widely accepted for
combining the results of multiple studies.171 Unlike a traditional
literature review, which provides a narrative summary of a literature, a
meta-analysis provides a quantitative summary. Anderson's 2004 metaanalysis is short. He assumed a general familiarity with meta-analytic
techniques and with the literature on the effects of video game violence.
Although Minnesota's brief provided an explanation of a meta-analysis,
it did so in only one sentence and without any references. 172 With no
significant explanation of the rationale for a meta-analysis, the judge's
failure to see the importance of replicating or cross-validating the
165

Id.

166 Id. at 1069 (quoting Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 959
(8th Cir. 2003)).
167 See Exhibit List, Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn.
2006) (No. 06-2268).
168 See Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 n.2.
169 Id. at 1069.
170 Id. at 1069 n.1.
171See, e.g., T.D. Stanley, Wheat from Chaff Meta-Analysis as Quantitative LiteratureReview,
15 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2001); MARK W. LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, PRACTICAL METAANALYSIS (2000); Dean A. Follmann & Michael A. Proschan, Valid Inference in Random Effects
Meta-Analysis, 55 BIOMETRICS 732 (1999); MORTON HUNT, HOW SCIENCE TAKES STOCK: THE
STORY OF META-ANALYSIS (1997).
172 See Memorandum of Defendant in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion For a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction at 21 n.27, Entertainment Software Ass'n v.
Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006) (No. 06-2268) ("A meta-analysis of violent video
games is particularly important, because while individual studies have often been criticized, a
meta-analysis provides a comprehensive look at all existing studies on the subject and, therefore,
provides a much stronger basis for the conclusion that exposure to violent video games leads to

psychological harm.").
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findings of multiple individual studies is less surprising. The judge's
footnote implied that Anderson took individual studies with nonfindings and somehow summed all the zeros to one. It is highly
unlikely that one study would prove to anyone's satisfaction a causal
relationship between video game violence and aggression, but the judge
implied that an individual study could do so-an idealized expectation
of what one study could accomplish.
There were legitimate reasons for the court to find Anderson's
meta-analysis inadequate to justify Minnesota's law, but these reasons
are primarily related to limitations in the scientific literature or
limitations in Anderson's presentation of the literature due to the nature
of the expected audience for a journal article. The judge in Hatch may
again have revealed an idealization of science when he described
several limitations of Anderson's meta-analysis as "flaws."l 73 He gave
three examples, 174 one of which he apparently did not understand. As
explained by the judge, Anderson acknowledged that "the body of
violent video game literature is not sufficiently large to conduct a
detailed meta-analysis of a specific feature."l 75 It's not at all clear from
the judge's opinion what Anderson meant here, including what specific
features could not be analyzed. What Anderson was referring to was
coding each study in the meta-analysis for various methodological
weaknesses. With a large enough sample, the consequences of these
individual weaknesses could have been analyzed, but these
methodological weaknesses were the specific features Anderson could
not analyze due to the small number of available studies. Anderson did
acknowledge that his meta-analysis included studies "known to have
potentially serious weaknesses." 76 As he could not study the particular
weaknesses with any specificity, he divided the studies into two general
categories: one with those studies that followed the best methodological
practices and one with those that did not.' 77 Additionally, Anderson
identified two other limitations to his meta-analysis: first, that the
available studies did not allow for good tests of video game violence
effects by the ages of the players 78 and, second, that there was a lack of
longitudinal studies.' 79 These were indeed limitations to the metaanalysis, but they were caused by the limitations in the scientific
literature. They were notflaws in the sense of mistakes or errors.
Judges are perhaps insufficiently exposed to scientific writings that
173 Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.1.
174 See id. at 1069.
175 Id

176Anderson (2004), supra note 7, at 118.
177 Seeid. at 118-19.
178See id.at 117.
179 See id. at I14-15.
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are forthcoming about their weaknesses or limitations. Lawyers are not
quick to highlight or even acknowledge the limitations in their
arguments. Presumably, the authors of research reports prepared for
purposes of litigation are not as forthcoming about the limitations of
their work as the authors of academic publications. This may explain
why the court in Hatch and the courts in other cases treated standard
scholarly statements about the limitations of their work as something
closer to admissions of failure. 80 The Ninth Circuit in Schwarzenegger
referred to "readily admitted flaws" in Anderson's research, and added
that "most of the studies suffer from significant, admitted flaws in
methodology as they relate to the State's claimed interest."181 The
qualifier in this last example-"as they relate to the State's interest"perhaps lessened the sense that the court thought the researchers made a
mess of things, insofar as the Ninth Circuit tied the "flaws" to what the
state wanted to accomplish rather than what the researchers wanted to
accomplish. Reading that courts have found methodological "flaws"
and that some courts have "rejected" this research,182 however, suggests
this research is largely junk science. Surely, good scientists wouldn't
produce research with these "flaws."
Misunderstanding the whole point of a meta-analysis rendered the
Hatch court's consideration of one a waste of time, but even if the judge
had not misunderstood the meta-analysis, it probably wasn't very useful
to him because of the way in which Anderson presented the research.
Anderson's 2004 meta-analysis did not include a usable summary of
how violence was defined and operationalized across the forty-four
studies, which is critical for assessing the value of the research. The
likely reason for Anderson's thin presentation is that a typical journal
article is meant to communicate results to fellow researchers, not to lay
people or courts. While extensive literature reviews are common in
legal scholarship, researchers in other disciplines often keep these
sections brief.183 The district court would have needed to look
elsewhere to really understand the literature summarized by Anderson's
meta-analysis.
Whether more studies or a more thorough analysis of the studies
submitted by Minnesota would have helped is not clear. The judge did
not even address several of the studies Minnesota submitted, and he said
very little about the research beyond his brief discussion of Anderson's
180 Cf Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 964 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(referring to "reasonable concessions").
181Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 963, 964 (9th Cir. 2009).
182 The Ninth Circuit noted that some courts had merely found Anderson's research
"insufficient." Id. at 963.
183 See, e.g., Guidelines for Manuscripts, AM. J. POL. ScI., http://www.ajps.org/manu

guides.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2011) ("Lengthy reviews of the literature are discouraged.").
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meta-analysis. In fairness to the judge, the opinion was a ruling on a
permanent injunction with a hearing on July 11, 2006 followed by the
publication of the opinion on July 31, 2006,184 one day before the law
was to take effect. There was little time to read and analyze a large
number of studies. Moreover, Minnesota may have rendered any
serious examination of the video game violence literature largely
irrelevant when the state's attorneys offered a notable concession that
the studies could not show a causal link between violent video games
and the harms the state sought to prevent.185
The district court judge in Hatch was not unique in offering a very
light review of the science. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit in Hatch,
Minnesota continued to emphasize Anderson's meta-analysis, but also
pointed to other studies.186 The Eighth Circuit's opinion, however,
referenced only the meta-analysis. 87 Providing courts with more
studies will not accomplish anything if the judges don't read them.
Some courts provided little analysis of what was submitted, instead
deferring to what a previous court said. The district court in
Schwarzenegger, for example, quoted the criticisms of Anderson's
meta-analysis in Hatch without going much beyond them.' 88 In
Granholm, Michigan submitted some of the same evidence Illinois
submitted in Blagojevich, and the district court mainly repeated the
conclusions from Blagojevich without conducting much independent
analysis.189
What would it take for a judge to truly understand the media
violence literature generally or the video game violence literature
specifically? Anderson concludes that the debate about whether media
violence causes aggression should have been over by 1975. As a
starting point for thinking about how much material a court would need
for a reasonably informed judgment, we could look to the size of the
literature at the time Anderson thinks a strong scientific consensus was
(or should have been) established. Using Paik and Comstock's 1994
meta-analysis as a guide, which focuses only on television violence,
there would have been approximately 150 studies through the end of
1975 with which to estimate television violence's effect on
aggression.190 The sheer quantity of studies available is only one
184 See Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1067 (D. Minn. 2006).

185See id. at

1069-70.

186See Appellant's Brief at 31-43, Hatch v. Entm't Software Ass'n, No. 06-3217 (8th Cir. Oct.
25, 2006).
187See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2008).
188See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57472, at *31-32 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
189Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652-54 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
190The estimate of 150 studies through 1975 is derived from Paik and Comstock as follows.
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consideration for assessing the persuasiveness of the research
literature's conclusions. Quality matters, too. But as a very rough
benchmark for the number of studies needed to persuade Anderson, 150
studies is still not the full universe.
The relevant literature is larger than just the original empirical
studies usable for a meta-analysis. As an example, randomized
experiments with laboratory controls are the most effective means for
demonstrating causal relationships, 191 but researchers often rely on
proxy measures of aggression in the laboratory. One common measure
involves a noise blast experiment where subjects who are first exposed
to violent and non-violent stimuli participate in a competitive reaction
time task on a computer.192 Subjects are told they are competing against
an unseen player and must try to click a button before their opponent.193
The loser is punished with a noise blast with the decibel levels
predetermined for those rounds where the subject loses.194 For the
rounds where the subject wins, he or she sets the decibel level (and
potentially the duration) with which to punish the fictional opponent.' 95
The researchers want to know whether those subjects first exposed to
media violence select higher decibel levels.196 Higher decibel levels are
coded as more aggressive.197
For this measure of aggression to be of any value in assessing the
impact of media violence, it is essential that the selection of decibel
levels is an externally valid measure of aggression, meaning that it has a
known relationship to some form of real-world aggression that we
actually care about. A typical journal article is not going to rehash the
reasons for thinking that the selection of decibel levels in these noise
blast experiments is valid. In fact, even Anderson, Gentile, and
Buckley's book-length treatment of video game violence simply asserts
Start with the 168 studies dating through 1977 used by Hearold in a previous study. Subtract the
47 studies Paik and Comstock list in Appendix A, which they discarded for methodological
reasons. Add the 34 studies they list in Appendix B, which Hearold omitted but Paik and
Comstock include, but then subtract the 8 studies in Appendix B from 1976 and 1977. Thus: 168
- 47 + 34 - 8 = 147, or approximately 150. The final number is an approximation because it may
still include a few studies from 1976 or 1977. See Paik & Comstock, supra note 129, at 520,
521-22, 540-42.
191See, e.g., Zhiqiang Tan, Regression and Weighting Methods for Causal Inference Using
Instrumental Variables, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1607, 1607 (2006) (stating that "randomized

experiments remain the gold standard for research"); Rose McDermott, Experimental
Methodology in Political Science, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 325, 339 (2002) ("No other methodology

can offer such strong support for the causal inferences that experiments allow.").
192See ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 62-63; Carnagey & Anderson, supra

note 142, at 886.
193See Carnagey & Anderson, supra note 142, at 886.
194See id.
195 See id.

196See id. at 887.
197 See id; ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supranote 4, at 62.
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without discussion that this measure has been validated. 198 As it is not
obvious that this measure is valid, it is difficult to be persuaded by
Anderson, Gentile, and Buckley's own noise-blast experiment without
tracking down the many articles that review the arguments for and
against these types of measures. As a matter of presentation, it's
notable that the authors would rest on an assertion for such a critical
point in a book aimed at a broader audience than just other media
researchers. A few paragraphs would certainly be helpful, though still
not enough to come to a firm conclusion. The literature on this subtopic
alone involves more studies than any court considered at any length in
these cases. 199 Articles on the validity of these proxy measures
therefore add even more material to a substantial number of
publications that must somehow be distilled down into a manageable
quantity for the courts.
While it's far from clear how much material should be submitted
to a court when the goal is for the court to make a reasonably informed
decision about the media violence literature, the quantity is more than
the courts discussed. While I do not think anyone would need to read
the entire media violence literature to fairly assess its conclusions, it is
startling that some courts attempted to assess it with only a single metaanalysis. Perhaps a plausible number is somewhere between one and
two dozen publications, including original research studies, literature
reviews, and meta-analyses, 200 but this requires attorneys to carefully
198See ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 62.
199See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARON & DEBORAH R. RICHARDSON, HUMAN AGGRESSION 58-85 (2d
ed. 1994); Craig A. Anderson & Brad J. Bushman, External Validity of "Trivial" Experiments:
The Case of Laboratory Aggression, 1 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 19 (1997); Craig A. Anderson,
James J. Lindsay & Brad J. Bushman, Research in the Psychological Laboratory: Truth or
Triviality?, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCi. 3 (1999); Sandy Bernstein, Deborah
Richardson & Georgina Hammock, Convergent and DiscriminantValidity of the Taylor andBuss
Measures of Physical Aggression, 13 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 15 (1987); Michael Carlson et al.,
Evidence for a General Construct of Aggression, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 377
(1989); Christopher J. Ferguson & Stephanie M. Rueda, Examining the Validity of the Modified
Taylor Competitive Reaction Time Test of Aggression, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMONOLOGY 121
(2009); Peter R. Giancola & Stephen T. Chermack, Construct Validity of LaboratoryAggression
Paradigms:A Response to Tedeschi and Quigley (1996), 3 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 237
(1998); Peter R. Giancola & Amos Zeichner, Construct Validity of a Competitive Reaction-Time
Aggression Paradigm, 21 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 199 (1995); Dominik Ritter & Mike Eslea, Hot
Sauce, Toy Guns, and Graffiti:A CriticalAccount of Current LaboratoryAggression Paradigms,
31 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 407 (2005); James T. Tedeschi & Brian M. Quigley, A Further
Comment on the Construct Validity of Laboratory Aggression Paradigms: A Response to
Giancola and Chermack, 5 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 127 (2000); James T. Tedeschi &
Brian M. Quigley, Limitations ofLaboratoryParadigmsfor Studying Aggression, I AGGRESSION
& VIOLENT BEHAV. 163 (1996).
200 As a relevant comparison, the amicus brief of Senator Leland Yee filed in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) cites about a dozen and a half studies

(depending on what one counts as relevant for these purposes). See Brief of Amicus Curiae of
California State Senator Leland Y. Yee, Ph.D, et al. at v-viii, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n,
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select publications from a sizeable collection of relevant material.
Attorneys probably cannot deliver several dozen studies to a court and
expect a judge to digest them, but they also cannot haphazardly select
what they will deliver. Careful and informed judgment is needed.
3. Explaining the Science
As one recognizes the challenge of selecting and explaining more
and more of the scientific literature, the problem of who will do the
translating grows too. Lawyers can easily photocopy scientific studies,
but when it comes time to explain the scientific research, the Annex
Books problem arises. 201 As that case illustrates, even basic questions
can pose a challenge for lawyers, but at least the attorney in Annex
Books knew what he did not know.
In the video game violence cases, one of the most striking
examples of an attorney's failure to properly explain the scientific
research comes from the Eighth Circuit. In Interactive DigitalSoftware
Ass'n v. St. Louis County (2003), the Eighth Circuit required the County
to demonstrate that the harm from video game violence on the
psychological health of minors was "real" and "not merely
conjectural." 202 The court added that the County needed "empirical
support for its belief that 'violent' video games cause psychological
harm to minors." 203
This supporting evidence needed to be
"substantial." 204 At no point did the court take the extreme position that
scientific certainty was required, even certainty in the ordinary sense of
the word, which probably means something like no serious dbubt.
However, in Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Swanson (2008), the next

video game violence case before the Eighth Circuit, the Interactive
Digital standard was transformed into one of scientific certainty. The
reason for this transformation appears to be that the attorneys for the
State of Minnesota misunderstood the scientific literature and then just
assumed their way into a higher standard than the one they started with.
The following exchange between an assistant attorney general
representing Minnesota and the Eighth Circuit is from the oral argument
in Swanson:
ATTORNEY: Well, this Court in Interactive Digital Software

Association recognized that the State's compelling interests in
protecting children from psychological harm are compelling at least
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2937557 at *v-viii.
201 Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2009); see supra notes 1834 and accompanying text.
202 Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003).
203 Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
204 Id
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in the abstract, but with respect to video games, the State needs to
provide substantial supporting evidence of the harm from those
games.
COURT: What did the district court find in this case?
ATTORNEY: In this case the district court improperly decided that
the State must provide evidence of a scientifically certain causal
relationship that exposure to video games causes harm to minors in
order for its interests to be compelling. The correct standard that the
State must meet to demonstrate that its interests are compelling is
that the legislature drew reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence that violent video games are harmful to minors'
psychological well-being and moral and ethical development.
COURT: Go back to Judge Smith's first question. What was our
holding in our Interactive case? Did our court hold that the State
may constitutionally restrict access to these violent videos?
ATTORNEY: The court did hold that the State may constitutionally
restrict that access if they provide substantial supporting evidence of
harm.
COURT: What about your opponent's argument that no court has
ever recognized that?
ATTORNEY: They-my opponent's argument is that the substantial
evidence required to meet that standard requires a causal link
-between violent video games and harm to minors. It's the State's
position that a causal link is not required.
COURT: The State's relying on the Anderson studies? Is that ....
ATTORNEY: Among others that were produced before the district
court and are now in the record before this court. The primary
Anderson study [2004] that the State relies on is an updated metaanalysis of his previous study that was before this court in the
Interactive Digital Software case, but that study had the benefit of

relying on additional studies that were performed after the panel
decision in Interactive DigitalSoftware Association.

COURT: And what was the district court's reaction to those studies?
ATTORNEY: The district court found that they were insufficient
because they did not establish a causal relationship, but again, it's the
State's position that a causal relationship is not required, and if the
studiesCOURT: What is it the State argues? What is the showing that is
sufficient?
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ATTORNEY: Well, in light of the different constitutional standards
applicable to minors, the State believes that substantial evidence
demonstrating a strong correlation which the State has presented in
this case is sufficient to sustain the restriction, and a strict causal
relationship should not be required. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the quantum of empirical evidence that is required
varies depending on the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised, and its past jurisprudence as to the First Amendment rights of
minors have shown that it is neither novel nor implausible for the
State to restrict minors' access to materials that are reasonably
believed to be harmful to them.
COURT: But you agree-I heard you say that there is a slight tradeoff, but you agree it has to be substantial supporting evidence?
ATTORNEY: Of harm, yes, but not that that harm need to be
established to a scientific certainty, which is what requiring a cause
and effect relationship does. Here we have substantial supporting

evidence of a strong correlation that exposure to violent video games
causes increased aggression and desensitization to violence in
minors[.]205

The notion that causation can only be sensibly discussed in situations of
certainty makes little sense, either in everyday speech or in scientific
speech. Of note is that these comments were not ill-considered answers
offered during the heat of oral argument. Similar arguments were made
in Minnesota's brief.206
Minnesota's position, presumably chosen by the state's attorneys,
was that one can speak only of correlations until the evidence rises to
the level of certainty, at which point one may then speak of causation.
This view may result from confusion about two separate questions:
First, what counts as causal evidence? Second, how certain are the
conclusions based on this evidence? Scientists are sometimes accused
of being "so wary of the warning that 'correlation is not causation' that
they will not state causal hypotheses or draw causal inferences" even
"when causality is the real subject of investigation." 207 Outside of
randomized experiments, statisticians are particularly allergic to causal
statements. 208 Professor Judea Pearl suggests the problem is serious: "It
205Oral Argument at 1:23, Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, No. 06-3217 (8th Cir. Feb. 12,
2007) (emphasis added).
206See Appellant's Brief at 27-30, Hatch v. Entm't Software Ass'n, No. 06-3217 (8th Cir. Oct.
25, 2006).
207 GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 75-76 (1994).

208See PEARL, supra note 51, at 340 (describing randomized experiments as "the one and only
causal concept permitted in mainstream statistics"); NANCY CARTWRIGHT, HUNTING CAUSES
AND USING THEM 198 (2007) ("Econometricians in my experience hate making assumptions, so
much so that they often give up altogether on making causal inferences about the world."); D.R.
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is an embarrassing yet inescapable fact that probability theory, the
official mathematical language of many empirical sciences, does not
permit us to express sentences such as 'Mud does not cause rain[.]"'209
Minnesota's attorneys may have mistaken a reluctance to talk about
causation by some academics or scientists for the belief that causation
can only be properly discussed under conditions of certainty. Many
scientists, however, clearly acknowledge their interest in causal
explanation, and contrary to the position of the State of Minnesota,
scientists can discuss causation even under conditions of uncertainty. 210
Indeed, scientists have little choice but to do so. Many causal
explanations are "plagued with uncertainty." 2 1 1 Evidence of correlation
does not necessarily indicate causation, but evidence of causation does
not necessarily indicate certainty either.
There are two general ways in which we might speak of certainty
that are relevant here. Scientists may speak of uncertainty about a
conclusion in a practical or pragmatic sense. Even conclusions
supported by experiments may remain uncertain in this sense, but this
kind of uncertainty can potentially be overcome, depending on the
quality of the evidence. 212 Scientific conclusions can be certain enough
to be useful. The level of certainty needed varies depending on the
circumstances. At the same time, scientists can concede that even
strongly supported scientific conclusions are, at the end of the day,
always subject to revision and therefore uncertain in a more
fundamental sense. The "fundamental problem of causal inference" is
one of uncertainty: "no matter how perfect the research design, no

Cox & Nanny Wermuth, Causality: A Statistical View, 72 INT'L STAT. REV. 285, 285 (2004)

("Statisticians concerned with the interpretation of their analyses have implicitly always been
interested in causality even if they have been sparing in the use of the word."); Paul W. Holland,
Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 945, 945 (1986) ("The reaction of many

statisticians when confronted with the possibility that their profession might contribute to a
discussion of causation is immediately to deny that there is any such possibility.").
209 PEARL, supra note 51, at 134.
210 See, e.g., Stanley B. Prusiner, A Unifying Role for Prions in Neurodegenerative Diseases,

SCIENCE, June 22, 2012, at 1511, 1511 ("In the past decade, there has been renewed interest in
the possibility that the proteins causing neurodegeneration are all prions[.]") (emphasis added);
NEIL A. CAMPBELL & JANE B. REECE, BIOLOGY 20 (7th ed. 2005) ("The observations and

inductions of discovery science engage inquisitive minds to seek natural causes and explanations
for those observations. What causes the diversification of finches on the GalApagos Islands? What
causes the roots of a plant seedling to grow downward and the leaf-bearing shoot to grow
upward?").
211 PEARL, supra note 51, at 1.
212 See, e.g., STEVEN SLOMAN, CAUSAL MODELS 64 (2005); Ronald Fisher, Cigarettes, Cancer,
and Statistics, 2 CENTENNIAL REV. 151, 153 (1958) (claiming that "by taking certain specific
precautions, entirely unchallengable conclusions can be obtained in the experimental field," but
also emphasizing the need for replication "in order to add precision to our results by diminishing
the error to which they are subject, and . . . as supplying the only means of the estimation of such
error").
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matter how much data we collect, no matter how perceptive the
observers, no matter how diligent the research assistants, and no matter
how much experimental control we have, we will never know a causal
inference for certain." 213 This kind of uncertainty cannot be overcome.
As some uncertainty always remains, uncertainty of no practical
concern today might become a concern tomorrow when new situations
or new problems arise.
Whatever Minnesota meant by the need for certainty, either
certainty in a practical or a more fundamental sense, the Eighth Circuit
did not say there is a need for certainty in Interactive Digital. The
Eighth Circuit did say it in Swanson, however, and the court apparently
said it because of the arguments made by Minnesota. Specifically,
Interactive Digital states that substantial evidence of causation is
required. 214 Minnesota said this means scientific certainty. In Swanson
the Eighth Circuit accepted Minnesota's re-description of Interactive
Digital without criticism or discussion. As a result, under Swanson the
evidence must establish "statistical certainty of causation" and provide
"incontrovertible proof of a causal relationship." 2 15 The Eighth Circuit
conceded its standard "may reflect a refined estrangement from reality,"
but claimed the standard was required under Interactive Digital.2 16
Perhaps due to a desire to avoid a similar "estrangement from reality,"
the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected a standard of "scientific certainty"
in Schwarzenegger.217

Requiring practical certainty may be a good legal standard when
First Amendment freedoms are at stake, but lawyers usually do not try
to weaken their own positions. It's unlikely that Minnesota's attorneys
intentionally did so. It's more likely that they were confusing issues of
correlation, causation, and certainty. Attorneys, as the middle-men and
-women between scientists and judges, are likely to be poor translators.
Minnesota actually increased its own burden by making the unnecessary
argument that causal evidence is equivalent to scientifically certain
evidence. Courts will probably do a better job of interpreting scientific
information when the attorneys do less of the interpreting. One way for
lawyers to do less is for the experts to do more, but this means the
experts need to talk directly to the judges.
Of all the written decisions in these video game violence cases, the
most thorough one (relatively speaking) is the decision written by Judge
213 KING ET AL., supra note 207, at 79. See also PEARL, supra note 51, at 60; Holland, supra

note 208, at 947; KARL PEARSON, THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE 113 (Adam & Charles Black 2d

ed. 1900).
214See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003).
215Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2008).
216 Id.

217

Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Kennelly of the Northern District of Illinois in Entertainment Software
Ass'n v. Blagojevich. While his analysis is not without limitations (and
while Craig Anderson, Illinois' lead witness, would no doubt disagree
with many of Kennelly's conclusions), Kennelly gave serious
consideration to the scientific evidence presented to him. One plausible
reason why his opinion is more thorough is that Kennelly presided over
a trial. He listened to extensive expert testimony and made findings of
fact. Anderson's direct and cross-examinations, for example, run over
100 pages in the trial transcript. Also of potential importance is that he
made use of the opportunity to ask questions of the experts. Kennelly
asked questions during the direct and cross-examination of Anderson,
and he asked additional questions after Anderson's crossexamination. 218 Some of his questions were very basic ones about
scientific research in general, such as the meanings of falsification and
reliability. 219 The meaning of falsification as applied to scientific
research is apparently unfamiliar to many judges. 220 Basic questions
may not be answered by journal articles written for a more expert
audience, and lawyers may not be able to answer even basic questions
about the research they provide to a court. The opportunity to obtain
answers to these questions could be critical for understanding the
scientific evidence.
Judge Kennelly also asked some basic but essential questions
about the video game violence literature in particular. He raised the
question, for example, of the importance of the context in which
violence occurs, asking whether a "horribly violent scene that goes on
for about half an hour" at the beginning of the movie Saving Private
Ryan is different than "a Van Damme movie where everybody is just
kicking the heck out of each other all the time?" 221 (Anderson replied,
"yes," but also that these findings "aren't as solid as the basic
218See Transcript of Proceedings at 212, Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, No. 05-4265
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2005) (beginning the direct examination of Anderson); Transcript of
Proceedings, Blagojevich, No. 05-4265, supra note 38, at 225 (continuing the direct examination
of Anderson); id at 274 (beginning the cross-examination of Anderson); id. at 336-50 (asking
additional questions of Anderson after the cross-examination).
219 See Transcript of Proceedings, Blagojevich, No. 05-4265, supra note 38, at 249, 342-43.
220See Gatowski et al., supra note 36, at 444-45 (describing how only six percent of state court
judges in a survey clearly understood the meaning of falsification, thirty-five percent clearly did
not understand its meaning, and the remaining judges had a questionable understanding of its
meaning). In Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist said, "I defer to no one in my confidence in
federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of
a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect some of them will be, too." Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
221Transcript of Proceedings, Blagojevich, No. 05-4265 (Nov. 15, 2005), supra note 38, at 348.
Judge Kennelly did not mention the title Saving Private Ryan, but it is clear from the context
what he meant.
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findings." 222)
Judge Kennelly also asked about the validity of the noise-blast
studies, which illustrates another benefit of a live interaction with an
expert. 223 Experts do not always communicate well with other experts,
often relying, for example, on unexplained statistical jargon. 224 Experts
are even less likely to explain things in terms non-experts will
understand, especially in journal articles with narrow readerships.
Sometimes they don't even see the need to make their research
comprehensible to non-experts despite its clear public policy
implications. In an article on the validity of laboratory measures of
aggression, including the noise blast measure, Craig Anderson, James
Lindsay, and Brad Bushman note that it is easy to understand why nonexperts doubt the validity of these measures, yet they seem to dismiss
the need to explain to non-experts why they consider these measures
valid:
It is easy to see why nonexperts frequently charge that lab studies are
trivial, artificial, and pointless, and easy to ignore such complaints as
reflections of ignorance. But when the charge comes from expertsother psychological researchers who presumably share goals,
training, and perspective-a thoughtful response is required. 225
This sentiment could explain why Anderson, Gentile, and Buckley's
book simply asserts that the measure of aggression tied to noise blasts is
valid without any explanation, but it seems uncharacteristic, at least for
some of these researchers, to question the need for clearer
communication with non-experts. Media violence researchers are
certainly free to pursue knowledge for its own sake and just talk
amongst themselves, but if they wish to contribute their findings to
discussions of public policy, then "a thoughtful response" to the doubts
and questions of even laypersons is required. Anderson in particular
has stated in multiple (co-authored) places that he sees a role for himself
and other scientists to communicate with the public, including courts. 2 26
Bushman and Anderson comment in one article on the failure of the
research community to communicate its findings to the public, prodding
researchers to "realize that the role of disseminating insights gained
Id.
223See id at 243-44, 339-40.
224 See Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and
222

Presentation, 44 AM. J.POL. Sci. 347 (2000).
225Anderson, Lindsay & Bushman, supra note 199, at 4.
226 See Douglas Gentile & Craig Anderson, Don't Read More into the Supreme Court's Ruling on
the Cahfornia Video Game Law, NEWSWISE (June 30, 2011 11:40 AM), http://

www.newswise.com/articles/don-t-read-more-into-the-supreme-court-s-ruling-on-the-californiavideo-game-law; Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 45.
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from their research is a part of their job[.]" 227 Explaining the validity of
laboratory measures should not be an exception.
Live testimony offers an opportunity to prompt experts to explain
things in a manner accessible to non-experts when, for whatever reason,
they might not otherwise do so. Judge Kennelly's exchange with
Anderson on the validity of the noise blast studies was relatively brief,
but it went beyond the assertions found in the book by Anderson,
Gentile, and Buckley and the assertions found in various journal
articles. It also led Kennelly to ask Anderson to what extent the media
violence literature relies on proxy measures as opposed to more direct
measures of aggression, that is, ones where the subjects' exposure to
media violence in the laboratory is followed by acts of physical
aggression.2 28 This interaction was an improvement over reading the
simple assertions found in many publications.
As an aid to the court, expert testimony is only sometimes
available. It is available to a district court when conducting an
evidentiary hearing on a request for a preliminary injunction. 229 It does
not appear, however, that any of the district court judges who ruled on a
motion for a preliminary injunction in the video game violence cases
heard live expert testimony about the scientific evidence. 230 In theory,
live testimony is also available when a court is ruling on a summary
judgment motion, but live testimony is rare in this circumstance as it
might lead a court to make inappropriate determinations of witness
credibility. 23 1 A bench trial like the one in Blagojevich of course allows
for live expert testimony, just as jury trials do. Appellate court judges,
on the other hand, are inevitably at an institutional disadvantage in
terms of direct access to the experts because live proceedings in
appellate courts, in the form of oral arguments, involve lawyers and
227 Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Media Violence and the American Public, 56 AM.

PSYCHOLOGIST 477, 487 (2001).
228See Transcript of Proceedings, Blagojevich, No. 05-4265 (Nov. 15, 2005), supra note 38, at
340-42.
229 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(c), 65(a).

230See Minute Entry re: Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, No.
06-431 (M.D. La. June 30, 2006) (recording that counsel presented arguments and filed exhibits
at the evidentiary hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction); Civil Minutes re: Plaintiffs
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. 054188 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2005) ("The Court heard oral argument from both sides and the Court
took this matter under submission."); Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, No. 03-1245 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2003)
(describing the evidence submitted as "memoranda, declarations, and exhibits"). Cf Am.
Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (describing
testimony at the hearing on plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction as including an art
director from a video game company).
231See Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2000); Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790
F.2d 624, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1986).
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judges, not witnesses. This puts the burden on the parties at the districtcourt level to generate an adequate record for any subsequent appeals.
B. The Supreme Court

Although the lower courts agreed that the various attempts of the
government defendants to regulate minors' access to violent video
games were unconstitutional, the Supreme Court nevertheless took up
the issue in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n. 232

Brown

involved California's violent video game law, Assembly Bill 1179. The
principal sponsor of California's violent video game law was Assembly
Member-now State Senator-Leland Yee. After Senator Joseph
Lieberman, Senator Yee, who holds a Ph.D. in child psychology, 233 is
probably the most prominent legislative critic of violent video games. 234
After sponsoring related legislation about violent video games the
previous year, 235 Lee introduced A.B. 450 in the California Assembly in
February 2005 and in September 2005 moved the language in A.B. 450
to A.B. 1179.236 Later in September, A.B. 1179 passed by a vote of 66
to 7 in the Assembly and a vote of 22 to 9 in the Senate. Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger approved the bill on October 7, 2005. Before
the effective date of the law on January 1, 2006, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined the
enforcement of the Act. 237 The Ninth Circuit and then the Supreme
Court both affirmed. 238
See Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (granting the petition
for a writ of certiorari), sub nom. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
232
233

See Larry Copeland, Battle over Violent Video Games Heating Up, USA TODAY, Jan. 29,

2004, at 3A.
234 Lieberman has been regularly involved in the issue. See, e.g., Jose Antonio Vargas, On
Capitol Hill: Blame Games, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2005, at C5 ("It has become an annual ritual
for the wide-smiled Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), who for many video gamers is the grinch
who every year tries to steal Christmas. Another year, another press conference, another speech
from the bully pulpit about the dangers of 'violent video games' . . . .").
235 See Assemb. B. 1792, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (introduced as a bill to regulate the
sale, rental, and distribution, and exhibition of violent video games); Assemb. B. 1793, 2003-04
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (approved as a bill requiring video game retailers to post information about
"a" video game rating system). See also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 20650 (2010) (requiring the
posting of consumer information about the video game rating system); Press Release, Violent
Video Game Legislation Passes Committee (Apr. 27, 2004) ("AB 1792 could not garner enough
support to receive the necessary 7 votes for passage. AB 1793 as amended, now calls for video
game retailers to display games with an "Adult Only" rating separate from all other games.").
236 Assemb. B. 1179, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005). The content of Assembly Bill 1179
originally appeared in Assembly Bill 450, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). See Appellants'
Opening Brief, supra note 115, at 4-5, ("Assembly Bill 1179 was gutted and amended, and
replaced with the language of Assembly Bill 450.").
See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. 05-4188, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57472 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
238 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), affd sub

237

nom. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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California's Act prohibited selling or renting violent video games
to minors and required these games to be labeled "18." Violators were
to be fined up to $1,000.239 The Act defined a violent video game as
one where a player could engage in "killing, maiming, dismembering,
or sexually assaulting an image of a human being" and further fit one of
two additional definitions. The first was that "[a] reasonable person,
considering the game as a whole, would find [it] appeals to a deviant or
morbid interest of minors," that it "is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors," and that
it lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors." 240 The second, alternative definition was that the game
allowed the player to "inflict serious injury upon images of human
beings or characters with substantially human characteristics in a
manner which is especially heinous, cruel, or depraved in that it
involves torture or serious physical abuse to the victim." 241 The Act
further defined "heinous," "cruel," "depraved," "torture," and "serious
physical abuse." 242 California conceded this second definition was
unconstitutionally broad for not excluding material with some
redeeming value for minors, 243 leaving the first definition for
consideration by the Supreme Court. 244 As he did in the Ninth Circuit,
Deputy Attorney General Morazzini disclaimed during oral argument
California's interest in preventing violent behavior, but California
nevertheless asserted in its brief an interest in preventing aggressive
behavior. 245
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority of the Court confirmed the
various decisions of the lower courts that refused to apply the Ginsberg
variable obscenity standard to violence. The Court did not discuss a
potential problem with the Act under Brandenburg, but the Court
agreed that the Act was subject to strict scrutiny: "Because the Act
imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid
unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny-that is,
239See Assemb. B. 1179, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); Cal. Civ. Code
(2010).
240 Cal. Civ. Code § 1746(d)(1)(A).

§§ 1746-1746.5

241Id at § 1746(d)(1)(B).
242See id. at § 1746(d)(2).

243The state's brief actually conceded that the second definition "may" be unconstitutional. See
Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 115, at 4 n. 1. The Ninth Circuit treated this statement as a
concession that the second definition was unconstitutional. See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 954
n.5. The Supreme Court followed the Ninth Circuit's lead on this point. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at
2744 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the second definition).
244 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732-33.
245See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729
(2011) (No. 08-1448); Petitioners' Brief at 41, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL
2787546 at *41.
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unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is
narrowly drawn to serve that interest." 246 Despite the concessions about
California's lack of interest in preventing violent or aggressive
behavior, the Court allowed for the possibility that California could
prevail if it could demonstrate that violent video games cause
aggressive behavior. 247 Thus, California was left to defend the Act with
the scientific evidence. Related to this requirement, the Court clarified
that applying strict scrutiny in this context does not mean deferring to
the predictive judgments of a legislature that are based on substantial
evidence. 248
At the beginning of its brief, California described the substantial
effort the legislature put into reviewing the scientific evidence and the
conclusions it reached. Oddly, California began with an implicit
concession that it could only show a correlation between video game
violence and aggression:
[T]he Legislature considered numerous studies, peer-reviewed
articles, and reports from social scientists and medical associations
that establish a correlationbetween playing violent video games and
an increase in aggressive thoughts and behavior, antisocial behavior,
and desensitization to violence in both minors and adults. 249
Later in its brief, California concluded the section focusing on the
scientific evidence with a statement that "the studies considered by the
Legislature conclusively establish a connection between playing violent
video games and increases in aggressive behavior in children." 250
According to California, the Ninth Circuit erred by requiring more
than correlational evidence. In its petition for a writ of certiorari and its
brief, California used phrases like "direct causal link," "proof of direct
causation," and "a direct causal nexus" to describe what it should not be
required to show, but what it claimed the Ninth Circuit demanded it
show. 251 The Ninth Circuit did indeed consider California's evidence
246 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738; see also id at 2742.

247 See id. at 2739 ("California relies primarily on the research of Dr. Craig Anderson and a few
other research psychologists whose studies purport to show a connection between exposure to
violent video games and harmful effects on children. These studies have been rejected by every
court to consider them, and with good reason: They do not prove that violent video games cause
minors to act aggressively (which would at least be a beginning).").
248 See id. at 2738-39.

249 Petitioners' Brief at 3, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2787546 at *3
(emphasis added).
250 Id. at 56 (emphasis added).

251 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, No. 081448 (May 19, 2009) ("direct causal link"); id. at iii ("direct causation"); id. at 4 ("sufficient
direct causal connection"); id. at 12 ("direct causal link"); id. at 13 ("direct causation");
Petitioners' Brief at i, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2787546 at *i ("direct
causal link"); id at iii ("direct causal link"); id at 5 ("direct causal connection"); id at 11 ("direct
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mostly correlational, but the Court of Appeals did not explicitly refer to
a need for direct causal evidence. 252 Somewhat surprisingly, the Ninth
Circuit wrote that California's evidence failed to even suggest a causal
link.2 53 An explanation is the "confusion" in the Ninth Circuit over
California's interest in restricting minors' access to violent video
games, whether the interest was preventing psychological and
neurological harm or aggression or both. As a result of Deputy
Attorney General Morazzini disclaiming an interest in preventing
aggressive behavior, the Ninth Circuit considered some of California's
evidence irrelevant. 254 But as described by California, the Ninth Circuit
actually demanded experimental evidence where minors are exposed to
violent games and where "such exposure directly causes the negative
physical and psychological impacts observed by the existing
literature." 255 Put another way, California claimed the Ninth Circuit
required more than experimental evidence; it required experimental
evidence where the effect (psychological harm to minors or, potentially,
aggressive behavior) can be observed directly, without resorting to
proxy variables like using noise blasts. California argued that such
evidence could never be obtained ethically, though it did so without
discussing the study that is the closest to what California said could not
be done: an experiment where the researchers exposed children to a
violent or non-violent game and then observed their subsequent
behavior. 256
California was likely correct, however, that an
experimental study could not be done using games as extreme as Postal
II, a graphically violent video game that California claimed would
qualify as violent under the Act.
There are a couple of points about the Court's treatment of the
scientific evidence relevant to the present Article, one a weakness in the
Court's analysis and the other one a strength. First, the Court claimed
causal link"); id at 48 ("direct causal link"); id. ("direct causation"); id. ("a direct causal nexus");
id at 49 ("directly causes"); id at 51 ("direct causation"); id. at 52 ("direct causal link").
252See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2009).
253See id. ("None of the research establishes or suggests a causal link between minors playing
violent video games and actual psychological or neurological harm, and inferences to that effect
would not be reasonable.").
254 See id. ("[T]his study largely relates to the player's violent or aggressive behavior toward
others-which, as noted above, is not the interest relied on by the State here-rather than the
psychological or neurological harm to the player.").
255Petitioners' Brief at 49, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2787546 at *49.
256 See A. Roland Irwin & Alan M. Gross, Cognitive Tempo, Violent Video Games, and
Aggressive Behavior in Young Boys, 10 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 337 (1995). In this study, sixty boys
between ages seven and eight played either the violent video game Double Dragon or the nonviolent game Excitebike and were subsequently observed engaging in free play and in interactions
with a child trained by the researchers. The subjects were videotaped through a one-way mirror.
In part, the researchers coded acts of physical and verbal aggression. Double Dragon, however,
would almost surely fail to qualify as a violent video game under California's Act.
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that the evidence in the scientific literature for the negative effects of
video game violence is correlational and not causal. 257 The majority
therefore accepted California's implicit (though confusing) concession.
Justice Breyer disagreed on this point in his dissent. 258 Neither opinion
offered any elaboration on why the evidence should be treated as
correlational or causal. In large part, this silence is understandable.
There are a variety of theories of causality-Nancy Cartwright notes
that there are nearly a dozen 259-but the Court is in no position to
arbitrate among these theories. The Court is better off remaining
agnostic about the various theories of causation and instead remaining
open to the variety of causal accounts offered by scientists.
In its brief, California said, "[R]esponsible, rigorous social science
uses field experiments, cross-sectional correlation studies, longitudinal
studies, and meta analyses combining the results of other studies to
form conclusions regarding causation." 260 California was correct:
media violence researchers and scientists often develop causal accounts
based on a variety of research designs, including experimental and nonexperimental designs. 261 Media violence researchers are not unusual in
doing so. California, however, was apparently unconvinced of its own
argument. California's entirely accurate point about how scientists
establish causation was overshadowed by its repeated statements that it
could not show a direct causal link between video game violence and
some type of harm to minors. California did not even say it could show
an "indirect" causal link (assuming that would be the right term).
Instead, it mostly described what it could show in terms of
correlations. 262
The Court relied on California's very narrow view of what counts
as causal evidence, one that requires experimental evidence without
257See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738-39 (2011).
258See id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 208, at 43. See also Woodward, supra note 51, at 3 (referring

to a "proliferation of self-contained schools" dealing with the topic of causation and explanation).
260 Petitioners' Brief at 49, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2787546 at *49.
261See Gentile, Saleem & Anderson, supra note 5, at 25; ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY,

supra note 4, at 22.
262See Petitioners' Brief at 3, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2787546 at *3
("[T]he Legislature considered numerous studies, peer-reviewed articles, and reports from social
scientists and medical associations that establish a correlation between playing violent video
games and an increase in aggressive thoughts and behavior, antisocial behavior, and
desensitization to violence in both minors and adults."); id. at 10 ("And social science has
developed to a point where a correlation can be demonstrated between minors who play violent
video games and physical and psychological harm."); id. at 52 ("Although there have been even
more studies since the California Legislature passed the Act, the evidence before it definitely
established a correlation between playing violent video games and increased automatic
aggressiveness, aggressive thoughts and behavior, antisocial behavior, and desensitization to
violence in minors and adults.").
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resorting to proxy variables. In fact, the Court did not even take
seriously the possibility that one might measure something of concern
in the real world, such as aggression, through the use of laboratory
measures that are highly correlated with the real-world phenomenon of
interest (nor did California really try to make the case for this point).
Justice Scalia's opinion instead dismissed the possibility with a brief,
sarcastic footnote: "One study, for example, found that children who
had just finished playing violent video games were more likely to fill in
the blank letter in 'explo e' with a 'd' (so that it reads 'explode') than
with an 'r' ('explore'). The prevention of this phenomenon, which
might have been anticipated with common sense, is not a compelling
state interest." 263
A more generous approach to causation, and one that tracks the
realities of scientific research, is to recognize that while spurious
correlations are indeed a legitimate concern for courts, scientists and
other researchers do not restrict causal conclusions only to conclusions
derived from randomized controlled experiments. Experiments are
favored for offering the strongest evidence of causation, but
correlational evidence can also be used to support causal arguments. 264
It can, for example, be used to narrow the number of variables likely to
cause a particular effect. 265 Obviously, increased caution is warranted
with correlational evidence, but as already noted, even experimental
evidence calls for some caution. 266 Again, the use of multiple research
designs by multiple researchers using multiple samples is often
preferable, and correlational evidence is often a legitimate part of this
mix. California essentially made this point, but ultimately gave little
263Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 n.7 (citation omitted). Cf Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich,
404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ("[T]he Court believes that many of the measures of
aggression used in violent video game research are likely valid[.]"). The word completion task
described by the Court may even be closer to actually measuring aggressive thoughts or cognition
than the noise blast studies are to measuring aggressive behavior.
264 See PEARL, supra note 51, at 59-60; JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE,

MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 113 (2009) ("[W]e believe that correlation can sometimes
provide pretty good evidence of a causal relation, even when the variable of interest has not been
manipulated by a researcher or experimenter."); CARTWRIGHT, supra note 208, at 190; SLOMAN,
supra note 212, at 63-64; Richard Scheines, The Similarity of CausalInference in Experimental
andNon-Experimental Studies, 72 PHIL. SCI. 927 (2005); Woodward, supra note 51, at 35 ("Nor,

of course, do I mean that one can learn about causal relationships only through experiments, or
that experimentation is always superior to passive observation as a way of finding out about
causal relationships."); JANET BUTTOLPH JOHNSON & RICHARD A. JOSLYN, POLITICAL SCIENCE

RESEARCH METHODS 114 (1986) ("[N]onexperimental observation may be used to test
hypotheses in a meaningful fashion."). But see Woodward, supra note 51, at 106 ("[T]here is a
widespread consensus among both causal modelers and philosophers that reliable causal inference
just on the basis of correlational evidence is not possible . . .
265See, e.g., SLOMAN, supranote 212, at 63-64.

266 Media violence researchers are often cautious: "[Tihe correlational nature of [the study]
means that causal statements are risky at best." Anderson & Dill, supra note 158, at 782.
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indication it was convinced by it. The result was a Supreme Court
decision quietly premised on a very narrow view of what counts as
causal evidence.
A second point is one to the Supreme Court's credit. The Court
recognized a very serious limitation of the video game violence research
that by itself justified the Court's decision: the California Act was
"wildly underinclusive" in targeting only certain types of violence. 267
Justice Scalia's opinion noted the breadth of the media violence
literature's definition of violence and the fact that the Act did not
regulate games comparable to supposedly violent cartoons like Bugs
Bunny or the Road Runner or E-rated video games like Sonic the
Hedgehog.268 Absent evidence that the games targeted by California are
particularly harmful, the Act made little sense. Such evidence is
apparently missing: "It appears that the assumption is made that the
more realistic human violence is the only type of violence that should
be restricted. However, with respect to the impact of electronic games,
there are no data to support this assumption." 269 As noted earlier, if the
media violence literature is correct about the harmful nature of media
violence, broadly defined, then the Act could have been
counterproductive by reinforcing the view among parents that only
graphic violence is harmful. 270
Comments from the oral argument offer additional support for the
conclusion that the Act was underinclusive. The text of the Act refers
only to depictions of certain forms of violence against humans.27 1 In
response to a question by Justice Sotomayor, Deputy Attorney General
267 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732.

268 See id. at 2739. See also Brief of Respondents at 42, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs.
Ass'n, No. 08-1448 (Sept. 10, 2010) ("[T]he credibility of Dr. Anderson's findings is further
undermined by his statements that even playful images of violence such as those found in Bugs
Bunny cartoons or E-rated games create the same 'effect' sizes as more violent video games.");
ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 77 ("Perhaps the most important new finding

was that even children's video games can increase aggression of children and college students if
the games contain a lot of violent action. That is, the cartoonish images, happy music, and lack of
blood (or realism) do not eliminate the short-term effects of violent video games on aggression.").
269 Funk et al., supra note 147, at 304. Anderson agreed with a similar point during his crossexamination. He was asked, "So, there's no support in the research that you've done or that you
can report on . . . saying that games that single out humanlike victims ought to be treated
differently from games that have alien victims?" Anderson responded, "That is correct."
Transcript of Proceedings, Blagojevich, No. 05-4265 (Nov. 15, 2005), supra note 38, at 327-28.
270 Even if there was scientific evidence showing that the games targeted by California are
particularly harmful, there is no evidence that the law would have reduced minors' exposure to
these games. The limited evidence available suggests that California's restrictions could have
made these games even more appealing to minors. One study of 310 Dutch youth from ages
seven to seventeen found that more restrictive age labels and violent content labels make games
more attractive to consumers, particularly boys. See Marije Nije Bijvank et al., Age and ViolentContent Labels Make Video Games Forbidden Fruitsfor Youth, 123 PEDIATRICS 870, 874-75

(2009).
271 See Assemb. B. 1179(d)(1), 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
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Morazzini conceded that the Act did not cover violence directed at
humanoid aliens like the fictional Vulcans from Star Trek.272 Video
game publishers could therefore have avoided the consequences of the
Act by something as minor as sharpening the ears and arching the
eyebrows of all of their characters and defining them as something other
than human. As many fictional alien species appearhuman, such as the
Kryptonians from Superman or the Time Lords from Doctor Who,273
perhaps even a small modification to the characters' ears and eyebrows
would not have been necessary to avoid the Act's restrictions.
Morazzini even agreed that the Act would not have covered violence
directed at something defined as an "android computer-simulated
person." 274 Where a game's creator defined otherwise human-looking
characters in a violent video game as another species, or even as
androids, it would have insulated a retailer from liability for selling or
renting the game to a minor. Insofar as the Act targeted certain forms of
extreme violence directed towards Captain Kirk but not Mr. Spock, it
seems not only underinclusive but also faintly ridiculous.
While the Supreme Court ultimately offered a compelling reason
for holding the California law unconstitutional, the Court by no means
offered anything close to a thorough review of the scientific literature.
In other circumstances, such a cursory examination of the science might
lead to a less compelling outcome. Justice Breyer's dissent offered
what might appear to be a very plausible solution to the challenges the
courts faced in dealing with a sizeable scientific literature: defer to the
legislature. 275 His dissent contains an appendix listing 115 articles he
classified as supporting the hypothesis that video game violence causes
harm and 34 articles he classified as rejecting it.276 Breyer said that
"like most judges," he "lack[s] the social science expertise to say
definitively who is right." 277 Based on the admittedly controverted
studies and expert opinions, he found sufficient evidence for the "Court
to defer to an elected legislature's conclusion that the video games in
question are particularly likely to harm children." 278
272 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729
(2011) (No. 08-1448).
273 Cf Doctor Who: The Beast Below (BBC One broadcast Apr. 10, 2010) (clarifying that Time
Lords came before humans, so Time Lords don't look like humans; humans instead look like
Time Lords).
274 Transcript of Oral Argument at 59-60, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448).
275 See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2770 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Unlike
the majority, I would find sufficient grounds in these studies and expert opinions for this Court to
defer to an elected legislature's conclusion that the video games in question are particularly likely
to harm children.").
276 See id. at 2771-79.
277 Id. at 2769.

278 Id at 2770.

Cf STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 126 (2010)
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Justice Breyer's solution might seem appealing, but he ultimately
shifts the question of this Article from the judiciary to the legislature:
how do legislators do in assessing scientific evidence? Furthermore,
how do legislators do as compared to judges? So far as I know, there is
no study, let alone a literature, assessing the relative skill of legislators
and judges in reviewing or assessing scientific evidence. Moreover, the
dominant goal usually associated with legislative behavior is
reelection, 279 which is not necessarily conducive to the careful
assessment of scientific evidence. As one prominent political scientist
notes, "Congress is not a research bureau," and as long as electoral
incentives dominate, "it is not likely to come to resemble one." 280
Breyer himself offered no reason why the California legislature was in a
better position to analyze the scientific evidence beyond the fact that the
legislature consists of elected officials. Breyer did not even provide any
specifics about the legislative record in California showing that it
performed particularly well in this case.
The comments by several judges in these cases do not provide
much of a basis for deferring to a legislative body's wisdom. Judge
Kennelly noted that the legislative record in Illinois did include
scholarly articles and written testimony, 281 but he expressed a concern
that the Illinois General Assembly failed to consider evidence against
the hypothesis that video game violence causes harm. 282 Another
district court said the legislative record in Louisiana included social
science evidence, but the record was nevertheless "sparse and could
hardly be called in any sense reliable." 283 Oklahoma, as previously
noted, relied on common sense, not the scientific evidence. While one
district court commented on the "unusually extensive legislative
history" supporting the Indianapolis and Marion County ordinance, the
court's report of the record fell significantly short of showing that the
elected officials actually read, studied, or analyzed the video game
violence literature in the record. 284
A preliminary look at the legislative history of California's violent
video game legislation suggests that it also did not do particularly well
in analyzing the scientific evidence. The bill history for A.B. 1179 does

("Legislators are better able than courts to gather empirical information, to make fact-based
predictions, and to exercise informed policy judgment.").
279 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 15-17 (2d ed. 2004); R.
DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5 (1990).
280 MAYHEW, supranote 279, at xv.
281See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
282 See id. at 1063.

283Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d. 823, 832 (M.D. La. 2006).
284 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947-48 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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not list any hearings, 285 but this bill was originally about the medical
treatment of foster children, not violent video games. 286 The relevant
legislative history would be elsewhere, either as part of the history of
A.B. 1792 or as part of the history of A.B. 450. A.B. 1792 was
Assembly Member Leland Yee's bill from the previous year that was
also about restricting minors' access to violent video games. 287 A.B. 450
was the earlier location of A.B. 1179's language. 288 There were two
video-recorded hearings in which witnesses testified before committees
in the California Assembly about the media violence literature, one for
A.B. 1792 in April 2004 and one for A.B. 450 in May 2005.289 Neither
hearing supports the notion that the legislature was better suited to
resolve the dispute among scientists about the effects of media violence.
On April 13, 2004, the California Assembly's Committee on Arts,
Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media held a combined
hearing on A.B. 1792 and A.B. 1793, both sponsored by Yee. 290 The
effect of A.B. 1792 would have been to amend an already existing
provision of the California Penal Code to define certain violent video
games as "harmful matter" for minors and therefore to restrict their sale
and distribution to minors. 29 1 A.B. 1793, as later enacted with the
support of the Entertainment Software Association, 292 requires video
game retailers to post a sign with information about the video game
rating system. 293 The part of the hearing on A.B. 1792 is therefore the
more relevant bill for a discussion about A.B. 1179.
285Bill histories are available at Legislative Counsel of Cal., Bill Information, OFFICIAL CAL.
LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
286 See Assemb. B. 1179, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Feb. 22, 2005) ("[a]n act to add Section
1507.25 to the Health and Safety Code, relating to community care facilities").
287See Assemb. B. 1792, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
288See supra note 236 and accompanying text.

289A press release reveals the possibility of a third hearing on April 18, 2005 before the
California Assembly's Judiciary Committee; however, the bill history on the legislature's website
does not list a hearing for that date, nor could the California State Archives identify a relevant
recording on or around that date. Even if there was a hearing, the press release mentions some of
the same individuals who later testified on May 3, 2005 before the Committee on Arts,
Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media. See Press Release, Assembly Judiciary
Committee Overwhelmingly Approves Yee's Violent Video Game Legislation (Apr. 18, 2005),
http://sd08.senate.ca.gov/news/2005-04-18-assembly-judiciary-committeeat
available
overwhelmingly-approves-yee-s-violent-video-game-legisl.
290See Hearing on Assemb. B. 1792, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) and Assemb. B. 1793,
2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), Standing Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism,
and Internet Media, California State Assembly, Catalog ID No. 04-0413Cl (Apr. 13, 2004)
(California State Archives DVD).
291 See Assemb. B. 1792, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
292See Hearing on Assemb. B. 450, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) at 01:34:15, Standing
Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media, California State
Assembly, Catalog ID No. 05-0503C2 (May 3, 2005) (California State Archives DVD)
(testimony of Gail Markels).
293See Assemb. B. 1793, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004); Cal. Penal Code § 313 (2004).
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The quality of the hearing offers little to no support for Justice
Breyer's claim that the courts should defer to the legislature. The
committee began by viewing a recording of footage from one or more
violent video games for approximately a minute-far too little to
establish any context for any of the violence depicted. 294 The
committee then heard testimony from four witnesses, two in favor of
and two against the bill (with several additional witnesses just noting
their support or opposition on behalf of various organizations). 295 These
four witnesses were allotted only five minutes each, which was not
enough time for any serious explanation of the media violence
literature. 296 None of the witnesses were media violence researchers
and none of them offered a detailed discussion of the scientific
literature. 297
The first witness in support, Becca Arnold of Citizens for
Responsible Media, offered only some general comments about the
media violence literature and devoted the end of her testimony to
recounting how a fourth-grade teacher she knew claimed that the level
of aggression among her students had increased over time. 298 The other
witness in favor of the bill, Dr. George Forest, was a representative of
the California Psychiatric Association and a practicing child
psychologist specializing in abused foster children. 299 Abused foster
children tend to be aggressive, he noted. 300 In general terms, he said
violent video games contribute to this aggression and also to
desensitization. 301 He explicitly mentioned the media violence literature
at the end of his testimony:
I think there have been plenty of studies that show that exposure to
violence and aggression on TV and in video games does lead to
aggressive behavior. Back in the 70s, it was the Bugs Bunny and
Wile E. Coyote and Daffy Duck cartoons that were found to lead to

294 The video game footage viewed by the committee cannot be seen on the recording of the
hearing. See Hearing on Assemb. B. 1792 and Assemb B. 1793, supra note 290, at
approximately 00:34:00 (DVD I of 2). The videotape used by the committee was probably the
same one later submitted to the Ninth Circuit. According to the Ninth Circuit, that videotape
contained "heavily edited selections," free of the relevant context for the violence, from Grand
Theft Auto: Vice City, Postal 2, and Duke Nukem 3D.

See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.

Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2009). A comment made during the committee
hearing suggests the one minute of footage was only from Postal2. See Hearing on Assemb. B.
1792 and Assemb. B. 1793, supra note 290, at 01:05:30 to 01:06:00 (DVD 1 of 2).
295See generally Hearing on Assemb. B. 1792 and Assemb. B. 1793, supranote 290.
296See generally id.
297 See generally id.

298See id at 00:42:30 to 00:46:45 (DVD 1 of 2).
299 See id. at 00:46:45 to 00:50:30 (DVD 1 of 2).
300 See id
301 See id
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increased aggression in children. This is far worse than that. The
spectrum is way off the scale. 302
Very general comments about "plenty" of studies is not very
compelling.
The first witness in opposition, Gail Markels, was the general
counsel for the Entertainment Software Association. 303 She argued that
the legislation was unnecessary and unconstitutional, and only briefly
mentioned the media violence literature when she reported that four
government or government-related organizations found the media
violence literature "inconclusive" and that several courts had already
concluded that the "the research is not adequate to determine that there
is causation." 304 The second witness in opposition, Mike Males, was an
academic who actually did focus on the media violence literature in his
testimony. 305 In particular, he argued that the trends in youth crime over
time were inconsistent with the claims of media violence researchers
and offered some general criticisms of the methodology of media
violence researchers, such as their reliance on proxy measures of
aggression, but he did not and could not develop any of these
controversial points in five minutes. 306
Given his background in child psychology, Assembly Member
Yee might have been expected to fill in the gaps on the media violence
literature. In response to a question from a member of the committee
after the witnesses completed their testimony for both A.B. 1792 and
1793, Yee offered a somewhat helpful explanation of the value of
experiments but then implied that no experimental research had been
302Id at 00:50:00 (DVD 1 of 2).
303See id. at 00:53:15 to 00:58:30 (DVD 1 of 2).
304The four organizations she mentioned were the Federal Trade Commission, the Washington
State Department of Health, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the United States
Surgeon General. The courts she mentioned were the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit and
"most recently" the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. See id.
305See id at 00:58:30 to 01:04:15 (DVD 1 of 2).
306 Anderson, Gentile, and Buckley strongly reject the claim that decreases in violent crime
undermine their claims that violent media cause aggression and even describe the argument as "so
weak as to be embarrassing" because it ignores the multiple causes of violence. ANDERSON,
GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 21. For some debate on this topic, see Christopher J.
Ferguson & John Kilburn, Much Ado About Nothing: The Misestimation and Overinterpretation
of Violent Video Game Effects in Eastern and Western Nations: Comment on Anderson et al.
(2010), 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 174, 176-77 (2010), and Brad J. Bushman, Hannah R. Rothstein &
Craig A. Anderson, Much Ado About Something: Violent Video Game Effects and a School of
Red Herring: Reply to Ferguson and Kilburn (2010), 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 182, 185 (2010). As
a relevant side note, Assembly Member Sarah Reyes rejected the witness' statistics on the decline
of youth violence, largely on the basis that crime was common in her hometown region of Central
and Southeast Fresno. She mentioned some specific incidents of crime in Fresno to reinforce her
point. See Hearing on Assemb. B. 1792 and Assemb. B. 1793, supra note 290, at 01:08:30 to
01:09:15 (DVD 1 of 2). Other members of the committee did question Reyes' unpersuasive
rejection of the crime statistics. See id at 01:12:30 to 01:13:00 to 01:14:45 (DVD 1 of2).
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done on the relationship between video game violence and
aggression. 307 This was not true even in 2004.308 Yee described the
reason for the lack of experiments as the difficulty offorcing people in a
free society to participate in experimental research, which inexplicably
ignored the common use of volunteers, including college students, who
are often paid or given course credit for their participation. 309
The May 3, 2005 hearing on A.B. 450, which later became A.B.
1179, was another opportunity for the California legislature to
demonstrate its skill with scientific evidence. 310 This time, the
committee did not view any video game footage. 311 The committee did
hear from seven witnesses, four in support and three opposed, with a
limit of fifteen minutes total for each side. 312 As with the previous
hearing, there were no media violence researchers and no serious
engagement with the scientific literature. Three of the witnesses in
support offered only general statements about the media violence
literature. The best overview of the media violence literature was
probably the one by Jo Seavey-Hultquist, the Program Director of the
Girl Scouts of Santa Clara County. 313 Her comments were more
detailed than the comments by Jim Steyer, a lawyer who founded
Common Sense Media, or Dr. Dean Blumberg, a pediatrician who
represented the California District of the American Academy of
Pediatrics. 314 Nevertheless, Ms. Seavey-Hultquist still addressed the
literature at a fairly general level during her brief comments. 315 The
fourth witness in support was Michelle Haunold, the owner of a record
company called Gearhead Records, who did not speak about the media
violence literature. 316 Of the three witnesses in opposition, Gail
Markels, again representing the Entertainment Software Association,
mostly repeated the general points she offered the previous year. 317 The
307 See Hearing on Assemb. B. 1792 and Assemb. B. 1793, supra note 290, at 02:00:30 to
02:02:30 (DVD 1 of 2).
308 See, e.g., Anderson & Dill, supra note 158; Irwin & Gross, supra note 256; Anderson & Ford,
supra note 131; Silvem & Williamson, supra note 130; Cooper & Mackie, supra note 130. For a
literature review of experimental work that predates Yee's comment, see Karen E. Dill & Jody C.
Dill, Video Game Violence: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 3 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT

BEHAV. 407, 414-20 (1998) (discussing the "small amount" of experimental research examining
the relationship between video game violence and aggression).
For a meta-analysis, see
Anderson (2004), supra note 7.
309 See, e.g., ANDERSON, GENTILE & BUCKLEY, supra note 4, at 62 ("College student participants
were given course credit; all others were paid $20 for their participation.").
310 Hearing on Assemb. B. 450, supra note 292.
311 See generally id
312 See generally id
313 See id at 00:49:45 to 00:53:00.
314 See id. at 00:41:45 to 00:55:45.
315 See id.at 00:49:45 to 00:53:00.
316 See id. at 00:55:45 to 00:57:15.
317 See id at 01:31:00 to 01:39:15.
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other two witnesses in opposition, John Merchant, the owner of a video
rental store in California, and Clay Calvert, a professor of
communications and law, did not address the media violence
literature. 318
The comments of two committee members suggest that a more
detailed discussion of the science during the hearings would not have
been worthwhile. Assembly Member Barbara Matthews, who later
voted against A.B. 1179,319 primarily worried about the ability of
retailers to comply with the bill's requirements, but she also
acknowledged that she was in no position to evaluate the science:
Experts really disagree on this. I know that, you know, we've
always got dueling experts up here and we'll get a 12-inch stack of
why this is a good idea and another 12-inch stack of equally
reputable, respected experts who, who say it's, it's a bad idea. . . . I
don't know if this has some lasting effect on children. I mean, we've
had domestic violence forever, and we've only had videos for a short
period of time, so there's been some problems besides bad videos,
so, but I don't disagree with you that we've, that maybe this is not
appropriate for young children. 320
Assembly Member Paul Koretz, who later voted in favor of A.B.
1179,321 worried about whether the industry had been given enough
time to make the private ratings system work and suggested Yee's bill
was premature; but unlike Matthews, he was confident that video game
violence is a problem:
I believe that violent video games do everything that that the
supporters of [Yee's] bill say. I think they're a great danger. I was a
co-author last year, and I think they absolutely can lead to violence
and do lead to violence. 322
After listening to the witnesses in opposition to the bill, Koretz
indicated that he did not need the science to know that video game
violence causes real-world violence:
I hope we don't hear people arguing anymore that this doesn't lead
to violence. I think, even if there aren't the studies yet, I think it's,
318See id. at 01:39:15 to 01:45:00.
319See Votes-Roll Call [AB 1179], OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub

/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1179_vote_20050908 1017PMasm floor.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013).
320 Hearing on Assemb. B. 450, supra note 292, at 01:11:35.
321See Votes-Roll Call [AB 1179], OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub

/05-06/bill/asmI/ab_1151-1200/ab_1179_vote_20050908_1017PM asm floor.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013).
322Hearing on Assemb. B. 450, supra note 292, at 01:16:35.
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it's very clear, it's very intuitive. I mean, if you're, if you're trying
to learn to do something, it's always said visualize it. Do it over and
over. That's how you'll, you'll be able to do it. I have no doubt this

leads to violence, and I think arguing against that is, is a way to try to
pick up supporters of this bill. 323
Several of the committee members during both hearings appeared
genuinely interested in grappling with the substantive issues raised by
the bill (as did Yee)-especially the First Amendment concerns-but
one would learn more about the media violence literature from Judge
Kennelly's opinion than from these hearings.
It's possible that the deficiencies in these two hearings were
corrected through other legislative activities related to one or more of
Yee's video game violence bills. Yee himself later acknowledged the
existence of experimental research on the effects of media violence,
indicating that his knowledge (or at least his staff's knowledge)
improved. 324 According to the brief filed with the Ninth Circuit by the
State of California, "The legislative record [was] flush with peerreviewed articles, studies, reports, and correspondence from leading
social scientists and medical associations." 325 How many legislators
actually read this material is unclear. While Yee had some familiarity
with the studies, the hearings suggest that no members of the committee
did.
A more thorough examination of the legislative history of the
video game violence bills sponsored by Yee would be needed to make a
fair determination of the quality of the legislature's handling of the
video game violence research, but the quality of the 2004 and 2005
hearings provide reasons for concern. An entirely plausible hypothesis
is that a judge who carefully read even one literature review was more
knowledgeable about the video game violence literature than most or
nearly all of the legislators in California who voted for A.B. 1179,
including the members of the committee who were present for the
hearings. At least by the end of the legislative process associated with
these bills, Yee may have been better informed on this topic than most
or all of the judges, but this fact alone would not offer much support for
Breyer's argument that courts should defer to a legislature when First
Amendment freedoms are at stake.
I return now to one of Haack's central concerns: the Supreme
323Id. at 01:49:35.

324 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of California State Senator Leland Y. Yee, Ph.D. et al. at 27,
Schwarzenegger v. Video Software Dealers Ass'n, No. 08-1448 (July 19, 2010) ("All major types
of research methodologies have been used, including experiments, cross-sectional correlational
studies, longitudinal studies, intervention studies and meta-analyses.").
325 Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 115, at 28.
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Court needed to resolve the Brown dispute with the information then
available to it. Like courts, legislatures face serious translation
challenges too. The Court could not wait for studies comparing
legislative and judicial competence in using scientific evidence or even
a narrower study on the quality of legislative decision-making behind
California's video game violence law. The First Amendment is a check
on majority decision-making, and First Amendment freedoms are too
important to restrict based on unsubstantiated assumptions about the
superior institutional capacity of legislatures to deal with scientific
evidence. There may be other good reasons to reject an argument for
legislative deference in this context, but in the absence of some reason
to think that at least the California legislature performed better in
analyzing the media violence literature than the courts, Justice Breyer's
argument for deference is particularly weak. The courts could not fairly
avoid the translation challenges in these cases by passing the issue to
the legislature.
CONCLUSION

Although the video game violence cases raised fewer problems for
dealing with scientific evidence than many other cases, serious
problems still occurred. The relevant literature is large, especially when
one recognizes that these cases cannot just be about whether video game
"violence" causes "aggression." At a minimum, these cases were also
about, or should have been about, a nuanced view of what counts as
violence and aggression, how to operationalize violence and aggression,
what types of violence may be particularly harmful, who might be most
susceptible to harmful effects from violent media, and whether
government restrictions would do anything to alleviate the harm. Only
in part did the courts deal with these assorted concerns. While this
literature is not the most complicated body of scientific research,
lawyers were often poorly equipped to translate it. Haack worries that
science and law may have irreconcilable differences, and there are no
obvious fixes for this problem generally. Translating the scientific
literature into something useful is challenging, but where judges interact
with the experts, there may be improvements. While one case study
cannot demonstrate that judges will better handle scientific evidence
when they are able to interact with experts, it is suggestive of a rather
common sense conclusion: judges will better understand scientific
evidence when the people who explain it to them understand it.
Oftentimes, these people are not the attorneys.

